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ESSAY
CONFRONTATION IN THE AGE OF PLEA BARGAINING
William Ortman*
A defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him is a
cornerstone of our adversarial system of criminal justice. Or is it? Under
current law, defendants can invoke their confrontation right only by
going to trial. But trials account for about ﬁve percent of criminal
convictions. That means that the overwhelming majority of defendants
convicted in the United States never get to exercise their constitutional
right to confront the government’s witnesses.
This Essay argues that the Supreme Court should align its
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence with the reality of contemporary
criminal justice. The Sixth Amendment grants a criminal defendant the
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” The problem is
that the Court reads this text as if it said “the witnesses against him at
trial.” Nothing compels the Court’s trial-centric gloss on what it means
to be a witness. To the contrary, the Confrontation Clause’s text and
purposes point towards recognizing that those whose “testimony” the
government relies on in plea bargaining are “witnesses” too. This Essay
therefore proposes a procedural device through which defendants could
exercise their right to confront (i.e., cross-examine) that class of
witnesses—the “Sixth Amendment deposition.” By conducting Sixth
Amendment depositions, defendants would learn the strengths and
weaknesses of the government’s evidence, enabling them to negotiate
fairer and more reliable plea bargains. Sixth Amendment depositions
would deliver to our “system of pleas” what confrontation at trial brought
to an earlier version of American criminal justice—adjudication
enhanced by adversarial testing of the government’s case.
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INTRODUCTION
In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court grandly declared that
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment “commands” that the
government’s case against a criminal defendant be tested in the “crucible
of cross-examination.”1 To enforce that edict, the Court held that prosecutors may not use uncrossed “testimonial hearsay” in criminal trials.2
This holding is widely viewed as seismic. Crawford “revolutionized this area
of the law,” a leading scholar noted recently.3 As another put it, “Crawford
is among the most important constitutional cases in modern times.”4
This Essay argues that the conventional understanding of Crawford as
“revolutionary” misses the forest for the trees. Crawford might have transformed Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, but it left the confrontation

1. 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
2. Id. at 61–62.
3. Michael S. Pardo, Confrontation After Scalia and Kennedy, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 757, 763
(2019) (“Crawford revolutionized this area of law by effectively severing the ties between the
Confrontation Clause’s requirements and modern hearsay law.”); see also Andrew C. Fine,
Reﬁning Crawford: The Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington and Hammon v.
Indiana, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 11, 11 (2006) (“[I]n Crawford v. Washington, the
Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause
analysis . . . .”); Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 101
Cornell L. Rev. 57, 69 (2015) (“The Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence over the past few decades has been nothing short of a revolution.”).
4. Gary Lawson, Confronting Crawford: Justice Scalia, the Judicial Method, and the
Adjudicative Limits of Originalism, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2265, 2266 (2017).
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right itself mostly dormant. That’s because the confrontation right the
Court articulated in Crawford is one that defendants can claim only at trial,
and our criminal legal system has remarkably few of those. Criminal
convictions today come overwhelmingly from guilty pleas, not guilty
verdicts.5 In a system of pleas,6 a confrontation right that attaches at trial
cannot make good on Crawford’s pledge to restore the “crucible of crossexamination.”7
Judicial and scholarly interest in confrontation has been immense
since Crawford.8 Yet it has slipped under the radar that plea bargaining
renders Crawford and the Confrontation Clause empty promises.9 It doesn’t
have to be this way. Plea bargaining and a robust confrontation right could
coexist. But for the Confrontation Clause to be more than a parchment
barrier, the Supreme Court would have to update its doctrine to account
for the world as it is—a world in which plea bargaining is ubiquitous.
Fortunately, there is precedent for such a move, and it comes from one of
the Confrontation Clause’s closest neighbors. In Laﬂer v. Cooper and
Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court updated the Sixth Amendment’s
Counsel Clause to make it relevant to today’s criminal legal system.10 This
Essay shows how the Court could do the same for the Confrontation Clause.
5. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
6. See Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).
7. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
8. Since 2004, the Court has spent hundreds of pages in the United States Reports
ﬂeshing out what Crawford means for criminal trials. For a list of the cases, see infra note 52.
Scholars have added tens or hundreds of thousands more. See Sopen B. Shah, Guidelines
for Guidelines: Implications of the Confrontation Clause’s Revival for Federal Sentencing,
48 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1039, 1050 (2015) (observing that “Crawford’s revival of the
Confrontation Clause inspired an industry’s worth of scholarship”); see also Andrew KingRies, State v. Mizenko: The Montana Supreme Court Wades into the Post-Crawford Waters, 67
Mont. L. Rev. 275, 280 (2006) (noting two years after Crawford that “[n]early three hundred
articles have been written that address the . . . decision”).
9. Shaakirrah Sanders and Sopen Shah come the closest to exposing the problem.
They (separately) argue that the practice of plea bargaining cuts in favor of extending the
confrontation right past the trial stage of the criminal process into sentencing hearings. See
Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Unbranding Confrontation as Only a Trial Right, 65 Hastings L.J.
1257, 1259 (2014) (“Testing the veracity of testimonial statements that are material to
punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as at trial . . . .”); Shah, supra note 8, at
1063 (“The confrontation right—or the probation department’s mere anticipation of the
confrontation requirement when preparing the [pre-sentence report]—could ameliorate . . .
situation[s where limited criminal history information was obtained prior to a guilty plea].”
(citing Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36
UCLA L. Rev. 83, 94 (1988))). I’m sympathetic to their arguments, but the claims I develop
here—that the confrontation right should apply prior to the trial phase, during plea
bargaining, and that it entitles defendants to take depositions in aid of the plea bargaining
process—are very different.
10. See Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 168–70 (acknowledging the ubiquity of pleas in the criminal
justice system and extending the right to the effective assistance of counsel to plea
negotiations); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012) (“The reality is that plea bargains
have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense
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Here’s the core argument. The Confrontation Clause provides that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”11 Crawford recognized that the
crucial question in implementing this text is ﬁguring out who counts as a
“witness against” an accused.12 The Court answered the question by deﬁning a witness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause as one who (1)
makes a “testimonial” statement that (2) the government uses at trial.13 I
take the “testimonial” component of the deﬁnition—which has generated
a lion’s share of the scholarly attention and case law—as given. Instead, I
challenge the requirement that the statement be used at trial.14
The Court’s trial-centric gloss on what it means to be a “witness against”
an accused is at odds with the reality of the American criminal legal system—
a “post-trial world” where the critical adjudicator is usually a prosecutor,
not a judge or jury.15 If only “trial witnesses” count as “witnesses,” then in
a world without trials there can be few “witnesses” and very little confrontation. The Court’s restrictive gloss on “witnesses” is also inconsistent with
the Sixth Amendment’s text, which attaches the confrontation right to
those facing “criminal prosecution,” not just those in trial.16 And it departs
from the Court’s treatment of the Sixth Amendment in Laﬂer and Frye,
where the Court held that a defendant may assert an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim when their lawyer’s deﬁcient performance caused them
to miss out on a favorable plea deal.17 In those cases, unlike in Crawford,
the Court rejected the theory that the Sixth Amendment is meant only to
ensure a fair trial.18 That was because, as the Court explained in Frye, “ours
‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.’”19
So then who are the “witnesses against” defendants in a system of pleas?
They are the people whose “testimony” is used in the only adjudication that
routinely matters—the plea bargain. The Confrontation Clause, I argue,
commands that the government confront the defendant with those people,
and the natural procedural mechanism for such confrontation is a
deposition. I therefore propose that in the age of plea bargaining, the
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met
to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires . . . .”).
11. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42–43.
13. See infra section II.B.
14. See infra section III.C.
15. See infra notes 66–68, 109–113 and accompanying text. See generally Jocelyn
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173
(2014) (coining the phrase “post-trial world”).
16. See infra notes 188–190 and accompanying text.
17. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 169–70 (2012) (rejecting the contention that “[a]
fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining”);
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) (holding that, under the Sixth Amendment, defense counsel must communicate plea offers to their clients).
18. See infra section I.B.
19. Frye, 566 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 170).
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Confrontation Clause entitles criminal defendants to take the deposition
of any accusatory “witness” whom prosecutors rely on in plea bargaining.20
Depositions are not a routine part of criminal practice today in the federal
system or in most states.21 But a few states already allow criminal defendants to take them, and nothing about the logic of criminal litigation is
inconsistent with depositions.22
The objective for “Sixth Amendment depositions” would be to
incorporate adversarial testing into plea bargaining outcomes. If the
government’s witnesses performed well under cross-examination, the
prosecutor’s negotiating leverage would increase, and with it the price of
a plea. If the witnesses did poorly, that would strengthen the defendant’s
hand. But whether depositions led to a higher or a lower plea price in any
particular case, adversarial testing of the government’s evidence would
have contributed to a fairer and more reliable adjudication.23 That is the
Confrontation Clause’s purpose.24 By modernizing the confrontation
right, by bringing it into the twenty-ﬁrst century (or just the twentieth),25
the Court could restore some of the adversarial process that plea
bargaining has upended.26
The full argument develops in three Parts. Part I describes the
problem in more detail, Part II diagnoses its doctrinal roots, and Part III
offers Sixth Amendment depositions as a solution. Part III also considers
several likely objections to the proposal—that depositions would be too
costly, that they would burden witnesses, and that they would become just
one more bargaining chip for prosecutors and defendants to haggle over
in plea bargaining—and argues that none justiﬁes preserving the status
20. See infra section III.A. Because plea bargaining is a ﬂuid process, I look to a ﬁxed
point—the ﬁling of charges—to determine the class of people on whom the prosecution
has relied. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
21. See Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deﬁcit in Criminal
Disputes, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 1091, 1094 (2014) (highlighting that typically, criminal discovery
statutes do not grant defendants formal pretrial information-gathering mechanisms such as
depositions, interrogatories, and document requests).
22. See infra notes 283–297 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 247–250 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 139, 200–201 and accompanying text.
25. See generally William Ortman, When Plea Bargaining Became Normal, 100 B.U.
L. Rev. 1435 (2020) (exploring the intellectual history of plea bargaining in the early- to
mid-twentieth century).
26. See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126
Harv. L. Rev. 150, 164 (2012) (“Plea bargaining today is fundamentally not adversarial but
collaborative (some would say collusive).”); see also Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative
System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2121 (1998) [hereinafter Lynch, Our
Administrative System] (noting that the pervasiveness of plea bargaining “has resulted in
the development of a system of justice that actually looks . . . far more like . . . an
inquisitorial system than like the idealized model of adversary justice described in the
textbooks”); James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 Yale L.J. 1346, 1472–74 (2015)
(acknowledging the historical pedigree of certain nonadversarial functions of the court).
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quo. Finally, a brief Conclusion situates the proposal as an installment
payment on the project of constitutional criminal procedure modernization
that the Court started in Laﬂer and Frye.
I. A TALE OF TWO CLAUSES
This Part provides background for the analysis to come. After brieﬂy
recapping Crawford and its progeny, section I.A explains why Crawford’s
trial-centric account of confrontation renders the right ineffectual in a
world with few trials. Section I.B then contrasts the Court’s handling of the
Confrontation Clause with its handling of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in Laﬂer and Frye. The comparison matters not only because the
two clauses share constitutional text but also because Laﬂer and Frye are
proof that Sixth Amendment rights can be modernized. Taken together,
the sections of this Part demonstrate that two of the major recent
developments in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence—Crawford, on the one
hand, and Laﬂer and Frye, on the other—rest on fundamentally different
understandings about how American criminal justice works in the twentyﬁrst century. Crawford imagines a world of trials, whereas Laﬂer and Frye
are grounded in the reality of plea bargaining. The Court treats these Sixth
Amendment neighbors as if they were strangers.
A.

The Marginal Confrontation Clause

The Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants the right
to cross-examine the government’s in-court witnesses.27 In that respect, it’s
a pretty straightforward constitutional right.28 But if that were all that it
did, the government could circumvent it by relying on hearsay evidence
instead of live testimony.29 An absent hearsay declarant, after all, can’t be

27. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) (“Our cases construing the
[Confrontation Clause] hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of crossexamination . . . .”).
28. Difficult questions do arise, even with respect to in-court witnesses. For instance,
can a witness be physically separated from a defendant? Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 855–57 (1990) (approving a procedure in which a child-witness testiﬁed remotely
using one-way closed-circuit video), with Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (commenting that where a screen blocks the witness from seeing the defendant, it is “difficult
to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant’s right to a face-toface encounter”). But as Richard Friedman observes, “For the most part, . . . the boundaries
of the confrontation right as applied to trial witnesses are tolerably clear.” Richard D.
Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011, 1011–12
(1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Confrontation].
29. See Richard D. Friedman, The Mold that Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 433,
441 (2014) [hereinafter Friedman, The Mold] (“Suppose . . . the witness does not attend
trial and that the prosecution attempts . . . to introduce evidence of [the out-of-court
witness’s] statement . . . . Plainly, such an evasion cannot be allowed, because doing so
would effectively create a system in which a witness could testify out of court, without
confrontation.”).
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cross-examined, at least not in the traditional sense.30 Thus, the Court has
long understood that the Clause also constrains the government’s reliance
on hearsay evidence.31 The question is what hearsay evidence runs afoul of
it.
Before Crawford, the Court’s answer was to “yoke” the confrontation
right to the hearsay rules.32 Under the Court’s 1980 decision in Ohio v.
Roberts, when an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement fell within a
“ﬁrmly rooted hearsay exception,” the Confrontation Clause posed no
obstacle to its admissibility.33 Indeed, even when an out-of-court statement was not admissible under a ﬁrmly rooted hearsay exception, the
Confrontation Clause still might not have stood in its way.34 The effect was
to subordinate the Confrontation Clause to the subconstitutional rules
governing hearsay.
That changed in 2004, when the Court announced in Crawford that
the Confrontation Clause would no longer be tethered to the hearsay
rules.35 But if not the hearsay rules, what would guide the Confrontation
Clause’s reach? The Court looked to history, in particular early modern
English history.36 It used a two-step historical methodology: First identify
the historical “abuses” that the Confrontation Clause was designed to
avoid, then determine what contemporary practices are analogous to those
abuses and ban them.37 Below, we consider part of the Court’s historical
analysis in depth.38 For now, a brief summary of the reasoning suffices.

30. But see John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual CrossExamination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 191, 196–97 (1999)
[hereinafter Douglass, Beyond Admissibility] (offering an approach for subjecting hearsay
to adversarial testing and impeaching hearsay declarants).
31. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895) (“The primary object
of the [Confrontation Clause] was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were
sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal
examination and cross-examination of the witness . . . .”).
32. David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3.
33. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
34. See id. (allowing for the possibility that hearsay may be admitted upon a “showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”); see also Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680,
683 n.1, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming the admission of a child-victim’s hearsay statements
as sufficiently reliable but noting that “both sides agree that Kansas’ child hearsay exception
is not ‘ﬁrmly rooted’ and hence is not presumptively reliable under Roberts”). Courts
admitting evidence on the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” logic sometimes
declined to say whether the hearsay would have qualiﬁed under a ﬁrmly rooted hearsay
exception. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021–23 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming the admission of codefendants’ guilty plea allocutions); United States v. Gallego,
191 F.3d 156, 167–68 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming the admission of a plea allocution); Sherman
v. Scott, 62 F.3d 136, 141–42 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming the admission of laboratory test
reports).
35. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004).
36. See id. at 42–43.
37. See id. at 44–45, 68.
38. See infra notes 143–161 and accompanying text.
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The principal historical “abuse[]” that the Confrontation Clause was
designed to avoid, the Court believed, was the use of “ex parte examinations
as evidence against the accused.”39 A pair of statutes enacted during the
reign of Queen Mary (in the sixteenth century) had directed justices of
the peace to examine certain witnesses in felony cases.40 While these
examinations were not originally meant to substitute for live trial witnesses,41
the Court reckoned that they eventually “came to be used as evidence” in
trials.42 As the common law evolved in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, however, it began to recognize the use of ex parte “Marian”
examinations at trial as abusive.43 By the time the Sixth Amendment was
adopted, according to the Court’s historical analysis, ex parte examinations
were admissible against an accused only if the witness was not available to
testify at trial and the defendant had previously had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness.44
Identifying the historical origins of the Sixth Amendment (or what it
believed to be the historical origins) was not the end of the Court’s interpretive work. There are no Marian examinations today, so the Court had
to determine which contemporary practices are so similar to the historical
“abuses” that they must be proscribed.45 On reaching that question, the
Court returned to the Confrontation Clause’s text, which, the Court
reasoned, “reﬂects” the historical “focus” on ex parte examinations.46
The Sixth Amendment affords defendants the right to be confronted
with the “witnesses against” them. A “witness[],” the Court explained,
citing the 1828 edition of Webster’s Dictionary, is one who “bear[s]
testimony,” that is, “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”47 A “witness against” a
criminal defendant is thus (on the Court’s analysis) someone whose
“testimony” is offered against the defendant. And that includes not only
those who testify live at trial but also those whose “testimonial” hearsay the

39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
40. They are known as the Marian bail and committal statutes. See id. at 43–44 (citing
1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (Eng.); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555) (Eng.)).
41. See John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany,
France 21–34 (1974) (“The predominant purpose of the statute was to institute systematic
questioning of the accused and the witnesses.”).
42. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44 (citing 2 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the
Crown 284 (Sollom Emlyn ed., London, Nutt & Gosling 1736)).
43. See id. at 43–47 (“Through a series of statutory and judicial reforms, English law
developed a right of confrontation that limited these [examination] abuses.”).
44. Id. at 54.
45. See id. at 51–53 (“Police interrogations bear a striking resemblance to
examinations by justices of the peace in England.”).
46. See id. at 50–51.
47. Id. at 51 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).
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government seeks to use.48 Thus, the Court concluded, “testimonial”
hearsay cannot be offered against a criminal defendant unless either (1)
the declarant testiﬁes at trial or (2) the declarant is unavailable and has
previously been subject to cross-examination by the defendant.49
This new formulation of the confrontation right raised many questions, but the most confounding was what it means for hearsay to be
“testimonial.” The Court declined to offer a “comprehensive deﬁnition,”50
but, drawing again on the history of Marian examinations, it did make one
seemingly clear point: “Statements taken by police officers in the course
of interrogations are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard,”
because they “bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of
the peace in England.”51
In the years since Crawford, the Court has decided nine major cases
ﬂeshing out its new Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.52 Most of them
have been about the meaning of “testimonial.” Difficult questions have
emerged in three interrelated contexts: (1) statements to law enforcement
officials during “emergencies,” (2) laboratory reports, and (3) statements
by very young children. The ﬁrst two categories spawned (separate) case
trilogies but no clear answers. In the emergencies context, the Court ﬁrst
decided that some statements made to 911 operators are testimonial while
others are not, with the distinction turning on whether the “primary
purpose” was to “enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”
(not testimonial) or to gather evidence (testimonial).53 Later, in a factintensive opinion with lots of interesting discussion and few clear
48. See id. at 52–53 (“In sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned
with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by law enforcement
officers fall squarely within that class.”).
49. Id. at 53–54. The Court noted one historical “deviation” from this rule, for dying
declarations. Id. at 56 n.6. The Court declined to “decide in this case whether the Sixth
Amendment incorporates an exception for testimonial dying declarations” but noted that
if the “exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” Id.
50. Id. at 68. The omission drew ﬁre from Chief Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 75
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of
thousands of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the speciﬁc kinds of
‘testimony’ the Court lists[] . . . is covered by the new rule.” (citation omitted)).
51. Id. at 52 (majority opinion).
52. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (2015); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality
opinion); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344
(2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S.
353 (2008); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813
(2006). For counting purposes, please note that Davis was consolidated with Hammon v.
Indiana. Davis, 547 U.S. at 813 n.*. Two of the cases resolved discrete legal points about the
Confrontation Clause’s scope. Whorton handled two such points, ruling ﬁrst that Crawford
was not a “watershed” decision that would apply retroactively and second that after Crawford,
“nontestimonial” statements were not subject to any Confrontation Clause scrutiny. 549 U.S.
at 420–21. Giles, decided the next year, clarified that a defendant forfeits their right to confront
a witness when they “engage[] in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying.”
554 U.S. at 359.
53. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
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guideposts, the Court ruled that a gunshot victim’s statements to police
officers about who shot him weren’t testimonial because they’d been made
in the context of an ongoing emergency.54 In the laboratory test trilogy,
the Court held ﬁrst that a forensic report identifying a substance as drugs
was testimonial, and thus inadmissible without testimony from the
certifying technician;55 then that the testimony of a different technician
(who didn’t perform the test) was not an adequate substitute;56 and ﬁnally
(in a plurality decision) that a technician could testify about a forensic
analysis performed and certiﬁed by a nontestifying technician from an
altogether different laboratory.57 The Court addressed the ﬁnal category
in its most recent major confrontation case, Ohio v. Clark, yielding
an unusually clear rule—that the statements of very young children to
teachers and other caregivers are typically, and perhaps always, nontestimonial.58
To summarize the last seventeen years of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, we’ve seen a landmark criminal procedure decision premised
on how sixteenth-century statutes evolved in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, followed by more than a half-dozen Supreme Court
decisions reﬁning, conﬁning, and questioning the resulting legal doctrine.
For jurists, law professors, and law students interested in history or doctrinal puzzles, the Crawford “revolution” has been tremendous intellectual
fun.59
But intellectual stimulation aside, has the revitalized Confrontation
Clause mattered very much in the real world of criminal cases? Does the
ordinary criminal defendant have greater access to adversarial testing of
the government’s case than they did before Crawford? It’s unlikely. That’s
because Crawford and the Confrontation Clause doctrine it begot are trialcentric, but we inhabit a post-trial world.
Consider again Crawford’s deﬁnition of “witnesses” as “those who
‘bear testimony.’”60 The Court meant those who bear testimony at trial.61
54. Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377–78.
55. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–11.
56. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 663.
57. Williams, 567 U.S. at 79.
58. Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2015). Adding to the uncertainty, since the
decision in Clark, both Justice Scalia—Crawford’s author and principal defender—and
Justice Kennedy—arguably its leading critic from the bench—have departed the Court. For
analysis of Crawford’s future in a post-Scalia and -Kennedy Court, see generally Pardo, supra
note 3.
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
60. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 Noah Webster, An
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).
61. In this respect Crawford was consistent with suggestions (short of holdings) in the
Court’s earlier cases that the confrontation right applies only at trial. See Barber v. Page,
390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (surmising that the “right to confrontation is basically a trial
right”); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 n.9 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(Powell, J.) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause only protects a defendant’s trial rights, and does
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Thus, in criticizing the Roberts approach to confrontation, the Court
observed that “the Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining
the reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state
courts, lack authority to replace it with one of our own devising.”62 The
Court made no effort to justify the “at trial” limitation, perhaps because
the point appeared self-evident to Crawford’s author, Justice Scalia. Part II
of the opinion begins by positing a range of deﬁnitions of “witness,” each
of which assumed a trial: “One could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a
defendant to mean those who actually testify at trial,” Scalia wrote, or
“those whose statements are offered at trial,” or (as the Court ultimately
found) “something in-between.”63 In Crawford’s wake, moreover, lower
courts have (with very few exceptions) understood that when the Court
said “witnesses,” it meant “witnesses at trial.”64
not compel the pretrial production of information that might be useful in preparing for
trial.”). Importantly (for purposes of the claim Part III develops), Justice Blackmun
concurred and wrote separately in Ritchie, denying Justice Powell the ﬁfth vote he needed
for a majority, because Blackmun did “not accept the plurality’s conclusion . . . that the
Confrontation Clause protects only a defendant’s trial rights and has no relevance to pretrial
discovery.” Id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67 (emphasis added); see also id. at 50–51 (“[W]e once again
reject the view that the Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court
testimony, and that its application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends upon
‘the law of Evidence for the time being.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 3 John Wigmore, A
Treatise on Evidence § 1397, at 101 (2d ed. 1923))). Justice Scalia was even more
unequivocal about the “at trial” limitation in his pre-Crawford dissent in Maryland v. Craig,
writing that “[t]he phrase [‘witness against’] obviously refers to those who give testimony
against the defendant at trial.” 497 U.S. 836, 865 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42–43. Though less important, the Crawford doctrine’s trialcentrism can also be seen in how it evaluates whether statements are “testimonial.” Only
out-of-court statements that the declarant would reasonably expect to be used at trial count.
See id. at 51–52. While this limitation is merely implied in Crawford, it is explicit in the
Court’s post-Crawford cases. In Bryant, Justice Sotomayor explained for the Court that when
the “primary purpose of an interrogation” is “not to create a record for trial,” the statement
is not testimonial. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011); see also Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009) (“Business and public records are generally
admissible absent confrontation . . . because—having been created for the administration
of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—
they are not testimonial.”). This limitation is problematic. Considering that only a tiny
fraction of criminal cases go to trial, see infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text, even
someone reporting a crime to police in an ordinary, nonemergency interrogation should
not rationally expect their report to be used at a trial. Richard Friedman has formulated the
meaning of testimony as “the transmittal of information for use in prosecution.” Richard D.
Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 241, 251 (2005)
[hereinafter Friedman, Meaning of Testimonial] (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., Vanmeter v. State, 165 S.W.3d 68, 74–75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]e
conclude that Crawford did not change prior law that the constitutional right of confrontation is a trial right, not a pretrial right which would transform it into a ‘constitutionally
compelled rule of [sic] discovery.’” (quoting Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52) (misquotation)); State
v. Zamzow, 892 N.W.2d 637, 646 (Wis. 2017) (“We agree with those jurisdictions in
concluding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply during suppression hearings.”).
But see Curry v. State, 228 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (“To deny a defendant the
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Crawford thus created a confrontation right that excludes certain evidence that prosecutors might otherwise use against defendants at trials. By
deﬁnition, that right cannot bear (at least not directly) on criminal cases
that are resolved by means other than trial.65 There are no “witnesses” in
such cases, as the Court deﬁnes the term, and so nobody for defendants to
be confronted with. And the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by
means other than trial. According to the commonly cited ﬁgures, ninetyseven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state
convictions are secured by guilty pleas,66 many of which are entered
pursuant to some sort of agreement.67 As the Supreme Court famously
remarked in a case we examine closely in section I.B, plea bargaining “is
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system.”68
Crawford, and the cases implementing and reﬁning it, thus created a
robust confrontation right that applies to a tiny fraction of criminal cases.
This is likely why Crawford’s practical consequences have been more muted
than its critics warned.69 In the laboratory test cases, the Justices debated
protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause at [a suppression hearing] essentially
denies him his only opportunity to ensure that the evidence presented against him is
reliable.”); Zamzow, 892 N.W.2d at 652 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (“The text of the Sixth
Amendment does not use the word ‘trial’ in stating the accused’s confrontation right.”).
Many of the lower court cases are collected and analyzed in an excellent student note. See
Christine Holst, Note, The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process
Solution, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1599, 1613–18.
65. At least not with respect to the guilt phase of a criminal prosecution. For an
argument that the confrontation right should attach to sentencing proceedings, see generally
Sanders, supra note 9 (proposing “uniform application at felony sentencing of the Sixth
Amendment’s structurally identical Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses”).
66. These ﬁgures trace to the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.
134, 143 (2012) (citing Sean Rosenmerkel, Matthew Durose & Donald Farole, DOJ, Felony
Sentences in State Courts, 2006—Statistical Tables 1 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH6F-2W7U] (last updated Nov. 22,
2010); Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 5.22.2009, Univ. Albany,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M6E-ZUTX]
(last visited Oct. 14, 2020)).
67. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 912 & n.1 (2006) (indicating that most felony guilty pleas result from
plea bargains); Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate Plea Bargaining, 57 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1225, 1228 (2016) (“Plea bargaining, or some comparable form of abbreviated,
consent-based adjudication process, is widely and routinely relied upon in criminal justice
systems worldwide as an alternative to trials.”).
68. Frye, 566 U.S. at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robert E. Scott
& William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
69. See Catherine Bonventre, The Implementation of Judicial Policy by Crime
Laboratories: An Examination of the Impact of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts 71 (2015)
(Ph.D. dissertation, University at Albany, State University of New York) (ProQuest) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the effects of Melendez-Diaz as “muted”); see also
Erin Murphy, The Mismatch Between Twenty-First-Century Forensic Evidence and Our
Antiquated Criminal Justice System, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 633, 661 (2014) (“Even the most
robust discovery and confrontation regimes will have little impact on the overwhelming

2021] CONFRONTATION IN THE AGE OF PLEA BARGAINING

463

whether requiring testimony from technicians would be a signiﬁcant
burden on states. Writing for the Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, Justice
Ginsburg explained that because few criminal cases make it to trial, the
burden would be minimal.70 In dissent, Justice Kennedy predicted that
“rigorous empirical studies . . . detailing the unfortunate effects of
[requiring technician testimony] are sure to be forthcoming.”71 Who was
right? In a 2015 dissertation, Catherine Bonventre reported the results of
a survey of forensic laboratory personnel about the consequences of the
Court’s decisions.72 “In general,” she found, “the impact of [the case law]
that emerged from the survey was not the catastrophe predicted by the
dissenting Justices,” explaining that the “majority of the respondents
reported minimal increases in personal appearances at trial, defense
subpoenas, and in-court testimony in speciﬁc forensic disciplines.”73 As
Bonventre recognized, an important factor contributing to her ﬁndings
was “the role of guilty plea dispositions in minimizing the impact of
requiring live testimony on the administration of justice.”74
It may be, however, that while the confrontation right does not bear
directly on a large share of criminal cases, it nonetheless inﬂuences the
prices that prosecutors and defendants negotiate for guilty pleas.75 If so, it
might be indirectly affecting a broad swath of criminal cases. Though
possible, this is unlikely, because of how plea bargaining works in the
American criminal legal system. A defendant’s trial rights come bundled—
he must take them all, by going to trial, or leave them all, by pleading
guilty.76 But the choice is often more theoretical than real. That’s because
majority of cases so long as those entitlements do not materialize until a case is set for
trial.”).
70. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 667 (2011).
71. Id. at 683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
72. Bonventre, supra note 69, at 57–69.
73. Id. at 71.
74. Id. at 110; see also Richard D. Friedman, The Sky Is Still Not Falling, 20 J.L. & Pol’y
427, 438–39 (2012) [hereinafter Friedman, The Sky] (positing that the assertion of a
confrontation right could, in some circumstances, be seen as “game-playing” and hamper
the defendant’s ability to reach a favorable plea bargain).
75. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 951 (1979) (developing a framework “to
consider how the rules and procedures used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the
bargaining process” in divorce courts). Justice Breyer raised this possibility at the oral
argument in Melendez-Diaz, speculating about how the Court’s ruling might affect bargaining leverage. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305 (2009) (No. 07-591).
76. For intriguing claims that criminal trial rights are or could be “unbundled,” see
generally Gregory M. Gilchrist, Trial Bargaining, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 609, 614 (2016) (“Trial
bargaining occurs where the defendant waives only limited trial rights, thus preserving a
trial that is shorter, cheaper, less uncertain, or some combination thereof, in exchange for
limited leniency.”); John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev.
181, 181 (2015) (“Criminal defendants can, and sometimes do, ‘unbundle’ their jury trial
rights and trade them piecemeal, consenting to streamlined trial procedures to reduce their
sentencing exposure.”).
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prosecutors usually enter plea negotiations with all or nearly all of the
leverage. They can credibly threaten that if the defendant goes to trial and
is convicted, his punishment will be far worse than if he pleads guilty.77 By
doing so, they can price the bundle of trial rights out of reach for most
defendants.
An example will illustrate. Imagine that you are indicted for
marijuana distribution and possession of a ﬁrearm. The prosecutor offers
you a deal—ﬁfteen years. But, she tells you, if you insist on a trial and lose,
she will seek—and she expects the judge will impose—a sentence of ﬁftyﬁve years.78 Now imagine that the government’s case turns on a conﬁdential informant who says that you sold him marijuana while wielding a
gun. If the jurors believe the informant, you’re done. If they don’t, you’ll
probably be acquitted. You know that there’s a chance that if your lawyer
cross-examines the informant, he’ll poke holes in the informant’s story
and expose him for the liar you know him to be. But witnesses are
unpredictable. Is the chance worth forty years of your life? Probably not.
And because she knows that it’s not, the prosecutor can safely ignore your
lawyer when he insists that the informant is lying.
Confrontation at trial is an element in a bundle of rights that few
defendants can credibly threaten to exercise. Accordingly, confrontation’s
value as a negotiating chip in plea bargaining is usually slight.79 In our
system of pleas, coercive trial penalties relegate confrontation to the
margins of criminal justice.

77. See William Ortman, Second-Best Criminal Justice, 96 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1061, 1071–
73 (2019) [hereinafter Ortman, Second-Best] (summarizing the literature on trial penalties).
78. The plea–trial sentencing differential in the example replicates the trial penalty in
a real case. Weldon Angelos was sentenced to ﬁfty-ﬁve years in federal prison for marijuana
distribution and ﬁrearm possession after turning down the prosecutor’s offer of ﬁfteen
years. See Jamie Fellner, An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How U.S. Federal Prosecutors Force
Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 276, 276 (2014). Aside from the
sentencing differential and the charges, however, the example is hypothetical.
79. There is a possible exception—domestic violence cases. Immediately after Crawford
was decided, many observers expressed concern about the case’s implications for domestic
violence prosecutions. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 Va. L.
Rev. 747, 749 (2005); see also Carol A. Chase, Is Crawford a “Get Out of Jail Free” Card for
Batterers and Abusers? An Argument for a Narrow Deﬁnition of “Testimonial”, 84 Or. L.
Rev. 1093, 1093–95 (2005); Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too:
Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 311, 311
(2005). Domestic violence cases frequently turn on the testimony of a single witness—the
victim—and victims often recant or refuse to testify at trial. Lininger, supra, at 768. Prior to
Crawford, prosecutors relied on victims’ hearsay statements—often in 911 calls or to police
officers—rather than live trial testimony. Id. at 773, 776–77. Crawford obviously made it more
difficult to rely on that kind of hearsay. Yet it is unclear whether Crawford actually had a
long-term impact on domestic violence prosecutions. No retrospective empirical study that
I have found examines the question. While it is possible that Crawford affected the mix of
domestic violence cases selected for prosecution, it is also possible that even in this context,
a trial-centric confrontation right doesn’t matter very much in world of pervasive plea
bargaining.
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Confrontation’s Neighbor

In the previous section, we saw that Crawford’s trial-centrism leaves the
Confrontation Clause with an ephemeral relationship to the real world of
criminal cases.80 This section juxtaposes the Court’s recent treatment of
the Confrontation Clause with its handling of the Sixth Amendment’s
Counsel Clause.81 The comparison is useful because the two clauses—
separated by only ten words—share the same introductory text, which
speciﬁes the bearer of both rights (the “accused”) and their scope (“all
criminal prosecutions”).82 But the comparison is relevant for a deeper
reason as well: It demonstrates that Sixth Amendment rights can be
modernized for the real world of criminal justice. The Court’s recent
Counsel Clause cases are thus evidence that the Confrontation Clause
need not be obsolete.
The Court’s key moves came in a pair of cases decided in 2012—Laﬂer
v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye.83 In Laﬂer and Frye, criminal defendants
sought postconviction relief on the grounds that their lawyers had
rendered ineffective assistance (thus depriving them of the “assistance of
counsel” guaranteed by the Counsel Clause) during plea negotiations.84
Anthony Cooper (the defendant in Laﬂer) had been charged with an array
of crimes in Michigan, including assault with intent to murder, after an
incident in which he ﬁred a gun at a person.85 Though he’d been inclined
to accept the prosecutor’s plea offer to a sentence of ﬁfty-one to eighty-ﬁve
months, he rejected it based on his lawyer’s novel and nonsensical belief
that Cooper could not be convicted of attempted murder because he’d
shot the victim “below the waist.”86 (Note for ﬁrst-year law students and
bar-takers: This is not a legal defense to attempted murder.) Cooper
proceeded to trial and was convicted, whereupon he received the
mandatory minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months.87 Galin Frye,
meanwhile, had been charged in Missouri with operating a vehicle while
his license was revoked, an offense carrying up to four years.88 The
prosecutor sent Frye’s lawyer a letter offering to resolve the case in one of
two ways—either Frye could plead to a misdemeanor and serve a ninetyday sentence, or he could plead to a felony and immediately serve ten days
in jail.89 The letter gave Frye a deadline (about a month and a half later)

80. See supra section I.A.
81. U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defence.”).
82. Id.
83. Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
84. See Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 160; Frye, 566 U.S. at 138.
85. Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 160–61.
86. Id. at 161.
87. Id.
88. Frye, 566 U.S. at 138.
89. Id. at 138–39.
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to make his choice.90 But Frye’s lawyer never told Frye about the
prosecutor’s letter, and the offers expired.91 Frye subsequently entered an
“open” guilty plea—i.e., he pled guilty without an agreement with the
prosecutor—and was sentenced to three years in prison.92
In both cases, a lawyer’s incompetence led a defendant to lose a
favorable plea offer. By the time the cases reached the Supreme Court,
prosecutors made no attempt to justify the defense lawyers’ performances.
Instead, they argued “prejudice.”93 To win relief on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under the famous (or infamous) Strickland test,
a defendant must show not only that his lawyer performed inadequately,
but also that the lawyer’s incompetence prejudiced him.94 In the Supreme
Court, the state prosecutors (and the United States as amicus) contended
that neither defendant was prejudiced by the lawyers’ failings because they
received full and fair process after the missed plea offers—for Cooper a
trial and for Frye a valid guilty plea.95
In 5-4 decisions, the Court, per Justice Kennedy, rebuffed the
prosecutors’ arguments.96 The Court noted first that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel “extends to the plea-bargaining process,” such that
defendants are “entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel”
during plea negotiations.97 It then explained that “in the context of pleas,”
Strickland’s prejudice element means that a defendant “must show the
outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent
advice.”98 In Cooper’s case, where his lawyer’s incompetent advice had led
him to reject a favorable offer, that meant that he would have to show a
“reasonable probability” that, but for the advice, he would have accepted
the offer and the trial court would have signed off.99 As to Frye, whose
lawyer didn’t even communicate the prosecutor’s offer, it meant that he
would need to “demonstrate a reasonable probability [that he] would have
accepted the earlier plea offer” had he known about it, and that the plea
would have not have been cancelled by the prosecutor or rejected by the
trial court.100 The Court ruled that Cooper had made his showing and

90. Id.
91. Id. at 139.
92. Id.
93. Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 174 (2012); Brief for the Petitioner at 18–19, Frye,
566 U.S. 134 (No. 10-444), 2011 WL 1593613.
94. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694–95 (1984); see also Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–60 (1985) (applying Strickland to a case involving a negotiated
guilty plea).
95. See Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 164–65; Frye, 566 U.S. at 141–42.
96. Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 160, 164–65, 175, 187; Frye, 566 U.S. at 138, 141–45, 151.
97. Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
98. Id. at 163.
99. Id. at 164.
100. Frye, 566 U.S. at 147.
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remanded the case to the lower courts to work out the remedy.101 It
remanded Frye’s case for a determination of whether he too had satisﬁed
Strickland’s prejudice element.102
On one level, these outcomes seem obvious. Cooper and Frye were
sentenced to spend additional years in prison because they had incompetent lawyers. If the right to counsel in the Sixth Amendment means
anything, it must surely condemn that.103 The obviousness of Laﬂer and
Frye, however, obscures the subtle jurisprudential move that the Court
made in these cases. As Justice Scalia explained in dissent, the prosecutors
had support in the Court’s cases.104 That’s because the Court’s pre-Laﬂer
and Frye jurisprudence was consistent with a trial-centric theory of the
Counsel Clause.
“Until today,” Justice Scalia declared, exaggerating only slightly, it
had been “entirely clear” that “the right to effective assistance has as its
purpose the assurance of a fair trial.”105 Scalia pointed out that in the
Court’s earlier cases dealing with ineffective assistance in plea bargaining,
Padilla v. Kentucky and Hill v. Lockhart, lawyers’ incompetence had caused
defendants to take bad plea deals, not to miss good ones.106 If the Sixth
Amendment’s exclusive purpose is to assure a fair trial, as Scalia claimed,
that procedural distinction makes all the difference. When a defendant
relies on incompetent advice to plead guilty, he has been wrongly deprived
of his right to a fair trial. When he relies on incompetent advice to plead
not guilty, on the other hand, he still gets a trial. He hasn’t given up
anything of constitutional signiﬁcance and, in Scalia’s view, he has suffered
no prejudice. Justice Scalia insisted that the Sixth Amendment demands
effective counsel for the “acceptance of a plea offer,” but not the rejection
of one.107
The majority spurned Justice Scalia’s trial-centric view of the Counsel
Clause. Rejecting his claim that the Sixth Amendment’s “protections
are . . . designed simply to protect the trial,” the Court instead embraced
a fair prosecution model of the Counsel Clause.108 And the Court made clear
why it was doing so. “[T]he right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot
be deﬁned or enforced,” the Court observed in Laﬂer, “without taking
101. Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 174–75.
102. Frye, 566 U.S. at 151.
103. See Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Laﬂer: No Big Deal, 122 Yale L.J. Online 39, 39–40
(2012) (“The only surprise about the Supreme Court’s recent decisions . . . is that there
were four dissents.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Laﬂer and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for
a Festering Wound, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 673, 674–75 (2013) [hereinafter Alschuler, Two Small
Band-Aids].
104. Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 177–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 178.
106. Id. at 177; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52
(1985).
107. Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 177 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 165 (majority opinion).

468

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:451

account of the central role plea bargaining plays in . . . determining
sentences.”109 Noting statistics showing that the vast majority of criminal
convictions are based on guilty pleas, the Court in Frye explained that
“ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,’” and
“the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is
almost always the critical point for a defendant.”110 Given that ground
truth, the Court reasoned, the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel must
assign defense lawyers “responsibilities in the plea bargain process.”111
“Anything less,” the Court observed, “might deny a defendant effective
representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice
would help him.”112
The Court thus fashioned a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the
actual criminal legal system, a system in which a plea bargain is, as Josh
Bowers puts it, “the expected mode of disposition.”113 For Justice Scalia,
this was madness, as the Constitution envisions trials as the ordinary vehicle
for criminal prosecutions.114 The disagreement between the Court and
Scalia in these cases implicated a deep question—whether constitutional
rules should be written for the world as it exists, with all its messy
compromises and complexities, or for the normative world in which
constitutional ﬁrst principles hold.115 The majority ruled for reality.
The Court’s opinions in Laﬂer and Frye can be understood as
examples of a mode of constitutional interpretation that Lawrence Lessig
dubs “translation.”116 “Context matters” in reading legal texts, Lessig
observes, but it changes over time, exposing gaps between the “context of

109. Id. at 170.
110. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (quoting Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 170).
111. Id. at 143.
112. Id. at 144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964)).
113. Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1083, 1087 (2016)
(emphasis omitted).
114. See Laﬂer, 566 U.S. at 185 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In the United States, we have
plea bargaining aplenty, but until today it has been regarded as a necessary evil.”).
115. To be clear, this is not an easy question. Imagine that you think that plea bargaining fundamentally perverts the criminal legal system. A constitutional rule that regulates
plea bargaining might well lead to a more sensible plea-bargaining regime. But it may also
further normalize the practice, making a world without plea bargaining even less likely. On
the other hand, a constitutional rule that prioritizes the constitutional ﬁrst principle of trials
would leave the unregulated “Wild West” of plea bargaining in place, leading to discrete
injustices in cases like Laﬂer and Frye, but at least it wouldn’t put another nail in the coffin
of trials. I explore this dynamic in Ortman, Second-Best, supra note 77.
116. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1189–211 (1993)
[hereinafter Lessig, Fidelity in Translation]; see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity & Constraint:
How the Supreme Court Has Read the American Constitution 49–64 (2019) [hereinafter
Lessig, Fidelity & Constraint]. For a review of Lessig’s theory of translation, see Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 941–
42 (2003).
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the writing” and the “context of the reading.”117 A legal interpreter committed to remaining “faithful” to legal texts thus “needs a way to neutralize
or accommodate the effect that changing context may have on meaning.”118
Enter “translation,” a “device for rendering a reading of a text in the target
context (usually a judicial opinion) that preserves the meaning of the
source text.”119 Translation, Lessig explains, “aims to achieve the same
meaning in the target context that a faithful reading of the source context
would have produced.”120
This was the Court’s approach in Laﬂer and Frye. No one could
plausibly claim that there was a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for plea
bargaining when the Sixth Amendment was adopted. Because plea
bargaining didn’t exist (in any meaningful sense) in the Founding Era,
such a claim would be incoherent.121 But defendants had the right to have
a lawyer assist them with the critical part of their criminal cases. It just so
happened that, in the Founding Era, the critical part of a criminal case was
a trial. That’s why the Counsel Clause meant a right to counsel for trial in
its “source context.” But between 1791 and 2012, the context changed,
with plea bargaining replacing trial as the critical part of most criminal
cases. The Court’s core holding in Laﬂer and Frye—that today there is a
right to counsel for plea bargaining—translated the Counsel Clause to
preserve its meaning in a new context.122
The Supreme Court decisions analyzed closely in this Part—Crawford,
Laﬂer, and Frye—understand twenty-ﬁrst century American criminal justice
very differently. Laﬂer and Frye are built for the world of plea bargaining;
Crawford is decidedly not. The result is a Sixth Amendment at odds with
itself. Its Counsel Clause stands ready (more or less) to deliver the right to
counsel to defendants in the age of plea bargaining.123 Its Confrontation
Clause, meanwhile, serves up the “crucible of cross-examination” mostly
on paper.
117. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 116, at 1175; see also Lessig, Fidelity &
Constraint, supra note 116, at 56.
118. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 116, at 1177.
119. Lessig, Fidelity & Constraint, supra note 116, at 56.
120. Id.
121. On the lack of plea bargaining at the Founding, see Albert W. Alschuler, Plea
Bargaining and Its History, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7–16 (1979).
122. My point is not to endorse “translation” as a general model of constitutional
interpretation. It is (more modestly) to suggest that Lessig’s theory aptly describes what the
Court did in Laﬂer and Frye.
123. “More or less” because while Laﬂer and Frye broke jurisprudential ground, they are
a far cry from thoroughgoing plea-bargaining reform. For critical perspectives on the
decisions, see Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Deﬁning Competence Beyond
Laﬂer and Frye, 53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 377, 407 (2016); Alschuler, Two Small Band-Aids, supra
note 103, at 674–77. The point is comparative. At least the Court paid attention to plea
bargaining and tried to make the right to counsel relevant. See Alkon, supra, at 407
(“Through its decisions in Laﬂer and Frye, the Supreme Court is ﬁnally showing a willingness
to more critically examine plea bargaining to better protect defendants’ rights.”).
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II. UPDATING CONFRONTATION
This Part explores the doctrinal roots of the problem Part I identiﬁes.
One source of trouble, section II.A explains, is that the Court has long
treated the Confrontation Clause as if it directly governs when hearsay can
be used by prosecutors in criminal trials. I argue that this approach is
mistaken. Although the Confrontation Clause has implications for the
admissibility of hearsay evidence, it announces a substantive right, not an
evidentiary rule. The rest of this Part concerns the most critical phrase in
the Confrontation Clause—“witnesses against.” Section II.B brieﬂy ﬁlls out
details of the Court’s current approach to deﬁning who is a “witness
against” an accused. Section II.C does the Essay’s doctrinal heavy lifting. It
takes aim at the Court’s position that “testimony” (whether live or hearsay)
must be used at trial to turn its maker into a “witness” for purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. This limitation is both textually unnecessary and
purpose defeating. The Court should instead deem a person a
Confrontation Clause “witness” if their “testimony” is used against a
defendant in a “critical adjudication,” a class of procedures that in today’s
criminal legal system would include both trials and plea bargains.
A.

Confrontation as a Substantive Right

As we see later in this Part, updating the Confrontation Clause for a
post-trial world means taking it beyond the courtroom.124 Before we get
there, we need to do some doctrinal brush clearing. The Supreme Court
has long treated the Confrontation Clause (as it pertains to information
from people not testifying live in court) as a rule governing the admissibility
of evidence.125 It construes the Confrontation Clause, that is, as giving
defendants the right to have certain hearsay excluded under certain
circumstances.126 John Douglass calls this the Court’s “exclusionary
thinking” about confrontation.127 It is an obstacle in our path. If the Confrontation Clause is merely a rule of admissibility, it plainly has nothing to
say about what goes on outside of courtrooms. This section clears the way
forward by showing that the Confrontation Clause is properly understood
as creating a substantive right, not an evidentiary one.128

124. See infra section II.C.
125. The Clause includes other rights with respect to in-court witnesses. See supra note
28 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
127. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 194; see also Eileen A. Scallen,
Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation
Clause, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 623, 628 (1992) (“When the Supreme Court focuses only on the
evidentiary dimension of confrontation, however, the other dimensions of the
Confrontation Clause fade into the background . . . .”).
128. In that it is a rule of constitutional criminal procedure, it might be more fully described as a “substantive rule of criminal procedure.” That more elaborate phrasing is unwieldy
(and unnecessary).

2021] CONFRONTATION IN THE AGE OF PLEA BARGAINING

471

In an article published shortly before Crawford, Douglass explained
that the Court’s exclusionary thinking about confrontation dominated
both before and during the era of Ohio v. Roberts.129 What he couldn’t know
at the time was whether the approach would survive the demise of Roberts.
But survive it did.130 The Court thus wrote in Crawford that the Framers of
the Sixth Amendment “would not have allowed admission of testimonial
statements of a witness who did not appear at trial.”131 And the leading
evidence treatise explains that Crawford “established a new mode of
analyzing how the Confrontation Clause regulates admission of hearsay.”132
What is wrong with the admissibility approach to confrontation?
Begin with the Sixth Amendment’s text. The Confrontation Clause, recall,
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”133 Nowhere
does it mention the admissibility of evidence,134 but it easily could have.
The clause might have provided that “no witness may testify against a
defendant without confrontation,” which would have sounded in admissibility. Instead, it bestows a speciﬁc right on a criminal defendant—the
right to “be confronted with” a person—that applies to anyone who
qualiﬁes as a “witness against” him.135
The text is describing a substantive right, not an evidentiary one.
Evidentiary rules exclude evidence because the evidence isn’t relevant or
reliable. The Confrontation Clause works differently. As Richard Friedman
observes, the Confrontation Clause “does not prescribe that a piece of
evidence is inadmissible because there is some defect in the evidence
itself.”136 Instead, it demands a process—cross-examination.137 As the
Court itself explained in Crawford, the Confrontation Clause “commands,
not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”138 And the
Confrontation Clause’s demand for cross-examination contributes directly
to the Sixth Amendment’s broader purpose—ensuring an adversarial
129. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 197–219. For a discussion of the
Roberts approach to confrontation, see supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
130. See Brooks Holland, Crawford & Beyond: How Far Have We Traveled from Roberts
After All?, 20 J.L. & Pol’y 517, 537 (2012) (“Crawford hitched confrontation’s wagon to an
exclusionary rule without clearly deﬁning the right itself.”).
131. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004) (emphasis added).
132. Kenneth S. Broun, George E. Dix, Edward J. Imwinkelried, David H. Kaye &
Eleanor Swift, McCormick on Evidence § 252(A) (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 8th ed. 2020)
(emphasis added).
133. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
134. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 224 (“The text says nothing of
excluding a witness’s testimony.”).
135. See Friedman, The Mold, supra note 29, at 440–41.
136. Id. at 441.
137. See id. at 440 (“[The Sixth Amendment] seems to say quite clearly that the accused
has a right to insist that those who testify against him be brought in his presence . . . .”).
138. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
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criminal process in which an accused has the “tools,” as Randolph Jonakait
puts it, “to challenge the evidence against him.”139
Still, it should probably not be a surprise that the Court hewed to an
admissibility approach during the Roberts era. Part I explains that Roberts
tied confrontation to the subconstitutional rules governing hearsay,140 and
those are quintessential rules of admissibility. It is more puzzling that the
Court persisted in its exclusionary thinking about confrontation in
Crawford, which detached the confrontation right from the hearsay rules.141
But while Crawford separated confrontation from the speciﬁc details of
hearsay law, and especially from the hearsay exceptions, it retained hearsay
law’s focus on evidentiary admissibility.
The text and purposes of the Sixth Amendment may not support an
admissibility approach to the Confrontation Clause, but Crawford directs
us to focus on history, especially early modern English history.142 Can we
account for the persistence of “exclusionary thinking” using the historical
methodology that Crawford prescribed? We can, but only superﬁcially.
Crawford’s key historical “ﬁnding” was that by the time the Sixth
Amendment was adopted, English common law courts excluded out-ofcourt witness statements unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant.143 The Court based that conclusion principally
on four cases—a misdemeanor case, Rex v. Paine, decided in 1696,144 and
three felony cases decided between 1787 and 1791.145 In the misdemeanor
and one of the felonies, judges excluded out-of-court examinations
because the defendants had not been afforded the opportunity to crossexamine the accusers.146 In another of the felonies, the court permitted
the jury to hear the accusation because the defendant had been present
for her accuser’s deposition.147 And in the remaining felony, the court
139. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative
History, 27 Rutgers L.J. 77, 114 (1995); see also Holland, supra note 130, at 537; Sklansky,
supra note 32, at 64–67.
140. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text.
143. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45–47.
144. R v. Paine (1696) 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 5 Mod. 163, 165.
145. R v. Dingler (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384, 2 Leach 561, 563; R v. Woodcock
(1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 354, 1 Leach 500, 503–04; R v. Radbourne (1787) 168 Eng. Rep.
330, 331–32, 1 Leach 457, 457–61.
146. See Dingler, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384, 2 Leach at 562 (excluding evidence because “in
the course which has been perused by [the magistrate], as the prisoner was not present, no
judicial examination has been taken, as he could not have the beneﬁt of crossexamination”); Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585, 5 Mod. at 165 (“[T]he Chief Justice declared,
that it was the opinion of both Courts that these depositions should not be given in evidence,
the defendant not being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so had lost
the beneﬁt of a cross-examination.”).
147. Radbourne, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332, 1 Leach at 461 (noting the prosecution’s
argument that the victim’s deposition “was admissible as an information taken by a regular
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admitted the accusation as a dying declaration, but indicated (in dicta)
that it would otherwise have to be excluded.148
All four of Crawford’s principal historical cases thus were about the
admissibility of hearsay evidence at trial. But the cases share another
distinctive feature. In each, the hearsay declarant was dead by the time of
trial.149 When an accuser dies without being cross-examined, confrontation is (obviously) impossible. Thereafter the only way to avoid denying
the accused their confrontation right at trial is to exclude the out-of-court
accusation.150 That’s exactly what happened in Rex v. Paine, the
misdemeanor, and in Rex v. Dingler, the most on-point of the felony
cases.151 The exclusion of hearsay evidence in those cases was not a
function of the confrontation right alone, but the combination of the
confrontation right and a dead declarant.
A broader look at early modern English cases reveals that
confrontation and evidentiary admissibility are independent concepts.152
The confrontation right that took shape in the eighteenth century
developed in part as a reaction to the political “state trials” of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, where defendants were often denied the
opportunity to confront their accusers “face-to-face.”153 As the nineteenthcentury historian James Fitzjames Stephens explained, the “proof” in
these cases was “usually given by reading depositions, confessions of
accomplices, [and] letters,” a practice that “occasioned frequent demands
by the prisoner to have his ‘accusers,’ i.e., the witnesses against him,
brought before him face to face.”154 Note that the defendants were not
asking the judges or juries to disregard the depositions, confessions, and

magistrate, under the statutes of Philip & Mary; for it had been given in the presence and
hearing of the prisoner”).
148. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353, 1 Leach at 502 (explaining that examination “was
not taken, as the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner was brought before him in
custody; the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of contradicting the facts it contains”).
149. The felonies were all homicide cases in which the declarant was the victim. Dingler,
168 Eng. Rep. at 383, 2 Leach at 561; Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 352, 1 Leach at 500–01;
Radbourne, 168 Eng. Rep. at 331–32, 1 Leach at 459–60. In Paine, the declarant was the
witness to whom the defendant’s allegedly libelous writing was delivered. 87 Eng. Rep. at
584, 5 Mod. at 163–64.
150. The dying declaration exception to confrontation may come into play, though, as
it did in Woodcock. See 168 Eng. Rep. at 352–54, 1 Leach at 501–04.
151. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
152. In Crawford, the Court recounted aspects of the broader history but then looked
elsewhere when formulating its admissibility-focused holding. See Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 43–45 (2004).
153. See Friedman, Confrontation, supra note 28, at 1024; see also 30 Charles Wright,
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr. & Daniel D. Blinka, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6321 (2d ed.
2020).
154. 1 James Fitzjames Stephens, A History of the Criminal Law of England 326 (1883);
see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (quoting Stephens, supra).
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letters. They wanted something else—to confront the people who made or
spoke them.155
The most prominent example of this phenomenon was the treason
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.156 At Raleigh’s trial, the Attorney General
(Edward Coke himself) read ex parte confessions by Henry Brooke
(usually referred to by his title, Lord Cobham), implicating Raleigh in a
plot against King James I.157 Raleigh demanded that Lord Cobham testify.
“[L]et my accuser come face to face and be deposed,” Raleigh insisted,
observing the irony that “[w]ere the case but for a small copyhold, you
would have witnesses or good proof to lead the jury to a verdict; and I am
here for my life!”158 As John Douglass explains, Raleigh’s demand was “for
confrontation, not for the exclusion of evidence.”159 And Raleigh’s
example is only the most prominent. In an earlier treason trial, during the
reign of King Edward VI, the Duke of Somerset “objected . . . many things
against the Witnesses, and desired they might be brought face to face.”160
Defendants’ demands for confrontation were, to be sure, often rebuffed.161
But the denials were among the historical “abuses” that, as the Supreme
Court explained in Crawford, hastened the confrontation right of the late
eighteenth century.162
The state trials support the claim that the Confrontation Clause
should not be understood as a rule that exclusively governs the
155. See Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 237 (explaining that the “Star
Chamber battles focused on confrontation, not on exclusion of hearsay”).
156. Raleigh’s trial is described in David Jardine, Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1
Criminal Trials 400 (1832). For accounts of the Raleigh trial’s signiﬁcance on the
development of the confrontation right, see Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Ralegh:
The Law of Treason, the Trial of Treason and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74
Miss. L.J. 869, 869 (2005); Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay:
Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation Clause, 81
Va. L. Rev. 149, 150 (1995). For a fascinating look at Raleigh’s life and trial, see Anna Beer,
Patriot or Traitor: The Life and Death of Sir Walter Ralegh (2018).
157. See Jardine, supra note 156, at 410–11.
158. Id. at 427.
159. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility, supra note 30, at 237.
160. See Proceedings Against Edward Duke of Somerset, for High Treason and Felony,
at Westminster: 5 Edward VI AD 1551., in 1 A Complete Collection of State Trials and
Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest
Period to the Year 1783, at 515, 520 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816).
161. Sir Raleigh’s request, for instance, was denied because (as the Chief Justice
explained) Lord Cobham “having ﬁrst confessed against himself voluntarily, and so charged
another person, if we shall now hear him again in person, he may for favour or fear retract
what formerly he hath said, and the jury may, by that means, be inveigled.” Jardine, supra
note 156, at 427.
162. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004); see also Friedman, Confrontation,
supra note 28, at 1024 (“[B]eginning even before the middle of the sixteenth century, we
ﬁnd repeated demands by treason defendants that their accusers be brought ‘face-to-face,’
and also repeated statutory support for this position. By the middle of the seventeenth
century, this position, and the accused’s right to examine the witness, had prevailed.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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admissibility of evidence. It is instead a substantive right of a criminal
defendant to “confront” (or “be confronted with”) the government’s
“witnesses” via cross-examination. That right has critical implications for
the admissibility of hearsay evidence, but treating it as a rule that directly
governs admissibility—as the Supreme Court has long done—skips several
steps.
Here is how the Court in Crawford should have explained the connection between the Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of testimonial
hearsay. As a substantive right, the Confrontation Clause doesn’t directly
prohibit the government from using any evidence, hearsay or otherwise.
Rather, it dictates what happens after the government uses a witness’s
testimony (including an out-of-court witness’s “testimonial hearsay”)
against a defendant.163 Namely, it tells us that the defendant must “be
confronted with” that witness.164 But imagine that the government uses
“testimonial hearsay” against a defendant, and—for whatever reason—
does not confront the defendant with the witness. Perhaps the declarant
is dead, making confrontation impossible, or perhaps the government just
prefers the declarant’s hearsay to what they’d say in court. Unless an
exception to the Confrontation Clause applies, the government’s failure
to confront the defendant with the witness violates the Sixth
Amendment.165 This is where the Confrontation Clause’s indirect effect on
the admissibility of evidence comes into play. When the government uses
testimonial hearsay against a defendant in circumstances where
confrontation will not be forthcoming, a Sixth Amendment violation
becomes inevitable.166 In order to avoid inevitable (or even just probable)
Sixth Amendment violations, courts exclude uncrossed testimonial
hearsay at trial. But the exclusion of evidence is, strictly speaking,
prophylactic. It’s the failure of confrontation following the introduction of

163. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
164. This assumes, of course, that the defendant has not previously cross-examined the
declarant. If the defendant has cross-examined the declarant, however, and if the declarant
has since become unavailable, Crawford provides that further confrontation isn’t constitutionally required. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
165. Thus, if the defendant is convicted, the conviction will have to be set aside, unless
perhaps the error could be deemed harmless. On harmless error analysis of Confrontation
Clause violations, see Daniel Epps, Harmless Errors and Substantial Rights, 131 Harv. L. Rev.
2117, 2167–68 (2018); John M. Greabe, Criminal Procedure Rights and Harmless Error: A
Response to Professor Epps, 118 Colum. L. Rev. Online 118, 123–27 (2018). See generally
David H. Kwasniewski, Note, Confrontation Clause Violations as Structural Defects, 96
Cornell L. Rev. 397 (2011) (discussing the Confrontation Clause and harmless error review
jurisprudence).
166. The inevitability of a violation is most obvious, of course, where the declarant is
dead or otherwise unavailable.
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testimonial hearsay—not the testimonial hearsay itself—that would actually violate the Sixth Amendment.167
Thus the Confrontation Clause regulates the admissibility of
testimonial hearsay indirectly. Courts want to avoid Sixth Amendment
violations, and for good reason. Accordingly, they do not permit prosecutors
to offer evidence that would likely or inevitably lead to a Confrontation
Clause violation. But the Confrontation Clause’s evidentiary implications
are just that—implications. The main show is the substantive right of
defendants to confront the witnesses against them. And as we will see, that
right can be invoked in settings that have nothing to do with the
admissibility or inadmissibility of hearsay at trial.
B.

Witnesses Against: The Conventional Account

We have seen that the Confrontation Clause is best understood as
creating a substantive right, rather than an evidentiary rule governing the
admissibility of hearsay evidence.168 Because we are working with a
substantive right, we need to consider the two questions that together
delineate any substantive right: (1) When does it apply (or “attach,” in
criminal procedure lingo), and (2) what does it entitle its holder to have
or do?169 The remainder of this Part explores the “attachment” question.
I take up the second question in Part III.
Determining when the confrontation right “attaches” is deceptively
simple, because the text of the Confrontation Clause appears to provide
an easy answer. The right to “be confronted,” the Sixth Amendment tells
us, attaches to a “witness[] against” an “accused” in a “criminal
prosecution[].”170 This formulation, of course, just shifts the inquiry. What
does it mean for a person to be a “witness against” a criminal defendant?
This section examines the Supreme Court’s current answer to that
question, which comes mostly from Crawford. Because we’ve already
encountered aspects of the Court’s key moves in deﬁning a “witness
against” in Crawford, the discussion here can be brief.171

167. For a somewhat similar argument, see Friedman, The Mold, supra note 29, at 441
(“[T]he procedural requirement of the Confrontation Clause is necessarily enforced by
means of an evidentiary rule of exclusion.”).
168. See supra section II.A.
169. This framework for understanding individual rights is most familiar from the
procedural due process context. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976)
(canonical case on what procedural due process requires); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261–63 (1970) (canonical case on whether procedural due process applies); see also Note,
Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest
Balancing, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1510, 1510 (1975) (“Due process adjudication typically involves
two analytically distinct issues: whether the right to due process is applicable; and, if so, what
procedures must be provided.”).
170. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
171. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
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Under the Court’s current approach, a person becomes a witness
against an accused when two elements are present: (1) The person makes
an out-of-court “testimonial statement,”172 and (2) the statement is used
by the government at the accused’s criminal trial.173 This section considers
each element in turn.
A large share of the post-Crawford writing about the Confrontation
Clause, both in the United States Reports and in the pages of law reviews,
has been about the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements.174 As Part I explains, Crawford declared that a witness is one
who “bear[s] testimony,” and testimony is “typically ‘a solemn declaration
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact.’”175 Only statements that do that, the Court decided in Crawford, can
trigger the Confrontation Clause.176 The testimonial/nontestimonial distinction has its supporters and detractors in the academy,177 and on the
Court.178 And then there is the difficult matter of ﬁguring out what testimonial means in a variety of litigated contexts, a project that has frequently
172. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004).
173. See id. at 50–51 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the . . . use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”).
Arguably, the second element should be further limited to instances in which the statement
is used to prove the truth of the matter which it asserts, the traditional deﬁnition of hearsay.
In Crawford, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985),
that out-of-court statements offered for propositions other than the truth of what they assert
raise no Confrontation Clause problems. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 n.9. The Crawford Court
did not speciﬁcally say that the reason nonhearsay statements are constitutionally
unproblematic is that their declarants are not “witnesses against” the accused, but that was
the explanation in Street. 471 U.S. at 414. That explanation makes sense. With a nonhearsay
statement—for instance a verbal act—the declarant’s veracity does not matter.
174. See supra notes 52–62 and accompanying text; see also Sabine Gless, AI in the
Courtroom: A Comparative Analysis of Machine Evidence in Criminal Trials, 51 Geo. J. Int’l
L. 195, 232 (2020) (“The meaning of the word ‘testimonial,’ or rather, the type of witness
that will trigger the Confrontation Clause, has been the subject of vigorous debates.”).
175. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 Noah
Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)); see also supra notes 47–
49 and accompanying text.
176. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
177. Compare, e.g., Friedman, The Sky, supra note 74, at 428 (“But it appeared to me
that the basic principle of Crawford was so obviously correct, so fundamental to our
system, . . . and so far superior to what had prevailed before, that prosecutors and judges as
well as those on the defense side would quickly come to accept it. Silly me.”), with George
Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 17, 17 (2014) (“[T]here’s
no denying [the] doctrine’s a muddle, if not as conceived, then as realized.”).
178. Compare Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 252 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“Crawford sought to bring our application of the Confrontation Clause back to its original
meaning, which was to exclude unconfronted statements made by witnesses—i.e.,
statements that were testimonial.” (emphasis omitted)), with Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
564 U.S. 647, 678 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[P]rinciples have weaved in and out of
the Crawford jurisprudence. Solemnity has sometimes been dispositive, and sometimes not.
So, too, with the elusive distinction between utterances aimed at proving past events, and
those calculated to help police keep the peace.” (citations omitted)).
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divided the Court in cases decided over the last seventeen years.179 These
debates are interesting, but they are for another day. All we need to say
is that under Crawford, a defendant’s confrontation right attaches only
when a person makes a testimonial statement—whatever that means. Of
course, the Court might someday replace the testimonial/nontestimonial
distinction in favor of some other limitation on what kinds of out-of-court
statements can trigger the confrontation right.180 For our purposes—
understanding the structure of the confrontation right—any such new
approach would simply slide into the position that “testimonial”
occupies currently.
Uttering a “testimonial” statement does not, by itself, make a person
a “witness against” an accused. Rather, the speaker is a “witness” under
Crawford only if their statement is used against a defendant at trial.181
There are two pieces to this requirement—that the testimony be used by
the government, and that it be used at trial.182 We’ve already assessed the
Court’s trial-centric gloss on the Confrontation Clause,183 but we need to
focus brieﬂy on the other part of this requirement, that the government
actually use the evidence.
American courtrooms operate on the principle of party control of the
evidence.184 This principle means that a nonparty cannot (typically)
become a “witness” unilaterally; rather, they have to be called by a party.185
The same logic applies to people made “witnesses” by dint of their out-ofcourt “testimony.” A person who has made a testimonial statement is
eligible to become a witness against a defendant, but until their statement
is actually used by a prosecutor, they are not one. The point may sound
needlessly formalistic, but it isn’t. During the course of an investigation,
many people might provide tips to the police, and, under virtually any
deﬁnition, those tips will qualify as “testimonial” statements. But police
receive lots of unhelpful tips of no value to them or to prosecutors. These
179. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
180. Some scholars, for instance, have suggested that the question should be whether a
statement is “accusatory.” See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation
Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & Pol’y 791, 847–49 (2007) (“Limiting the
Confrontation Clause’s operation to accusations . . . would not be inconsistent with the
principles that underlie Crawford.”); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging
and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. Rich. L. Rev. 511, 544 (2005) [hereinafter
Mosteller, Confrontation of Witnesses] (“When a statement is accusatory and intended to be
conveyed beyond those who would be expected to keep it conﬁdential . . . it should be
considered testimonial.”).
181. See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 172–174 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Mirjan R. Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift 74–75 (1997) (describing how
the adversarial system reserves to litigants the power to decide what evidence will be
gathered, introduced, and presented in court for proof).
185. Or, at least in some jurisdictions, they can be called to testify by the judge. See Fed.
R. Evid. 614(a) (“The court may call a witness on its own or at a party’s request.”).
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“unused” tips, despite being testimonial, obviously trigger no confrontation rights.186
C.

Witnesses Against: Updated Account

A quick recap for those just joining us—under current law, criminal
defendants have the right to be confronted with anyone whose
“testimonial” hearsay is used against them at trial.187 This section makes
the case for revisiting the last two words of this test. My argument mirrors
the Court’s in Laﬂer and Frye. To put it simply—denying a defendant
confrontation during plea bargaining makes no more sense than denying
him an effective lawyer during plea bargaining. But I need to back up.
As a preliminary matter, the Court’s “at trial” limiting principle has
no anchor in the text of the Sixth Amendment. The amendment’s
opening phrase makes clear that the Confrontation Clause applies to
“criminal prosecutions,” not just to trials.188 That same phrase, moreover,
applies to the Counsel Clause, and we see in section I.B that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies to at least one stage of a “criminal
prosecution” (plea bargaining) that is entirely independent of trial.189 It’s
not impossible that the single phrase “criminal prosecution” in the Sixth
Amendment means different things for different clauses, but that reading
is awkward.190

186. The Court conﬁrmed that testimonial statements must be used to trigger the
Confrontation Clause by approving “notice-and-demand” statutes for laboratory analyst
testimony in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 326–27 (2009). These statutes,
the Court explained, “require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its
intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial,” at which point the defendant has the
opportunity (and obligation) to object under the Confrontation Clause. Id. The statutes
make sense only if the defendant’s confrontation right is triggered by the government’s use
of testimonial statements, and not their mere existence.
187. See supra section II.B.
188. U.S. Const. amend VI; see also Friedman, Meaning of Testimonial, supra note 63,
at 250 (“Indeed, it seems the confrontation right should be independent of a right to
trial.”). Friedman goes on to note that “[e]ven if there were no proceeding recognizable as
a trial—even if all testimony were recorded and delivered piecemeal behind closed doors to
a fact-ﬁnder—the accused should have a right to confront the witness.” Friedman, Meaning
of Testimonial, supra note 63, at 250–51. In a very rough sense, this foreshadows what this
Essay proposes in Part III.
189. See supra notes 108–115 and accompanying text.
190. See John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital
Sentencing, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1967, 2009 (2005) (“The text suggests that, whenever the
rights of notice, confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel apply, they apply together.
All of those rights are in the same sentence, which, as a matter of simple grammar, lists them
collectively as the rights an accused ‘shall enjoy’ ‘in all criminal prosecutions.’” (quoting
U.S. Const. amend. VI)).
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That said, the text by itself is hardly dispositive.191 The bigger reason
for revisiting the “at trial” limitation is that, in our post-trial world, it drains
the confrontation right of meaning. To develop this part of the argument,
I’ll need to explain what would replace “at trial.” It takes a doctrine to beat
a doctrine.192
In lieu of the “at trial” limitation in the current deﬁnition of a Confrontation Clause “witness,” I propose substituting “critical adjudication.”
On this approach, confrontation would attach whenever the government
uses a person’s (1) testimonial hearsay at (2) a critical adjudication.193 The
limitation is borrowed from the Court’s Counsel Clause jurisprudence, so
we need to take a quick detour back to that corner of the Sixth Amendment.
The Court has long held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies only in “critical stages” of criminal prosecutions.194 It has articulated the distinction between critical and noncritical stages in various
ways over the years.195 One of the most useful formulations was from
191. It rarely is on questions involving the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (“The Constitution’s text does not alone resolve this
case.”).
192. This is a variant of the well-known (among law professors anyway) expression that
“[i]t takes a theory to beat a theory.” See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, In Praise of Legal
Scholarship, 25 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 801, 815 (2017) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: It Takes
a Theory to Beat a Theory, Legal Theory Blog, https://lsolum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2018/07/legal-theory-lexicon-it-takes-a-theory-to-beat-a-theory.html [https://
perma.cc/GQ6Z-H8UL] (last modified July 8, 2018)).
193. In principle, it would be possible to eliminate the “at trial” limitation and not
replace it with anything. On that reading, a defendant’s confrontation right would attach
whenever the government uses a person’s testimonial statement against him at any point in
a criminal prosecution. We needn’t go that far to make the Confrontation Clause relevant
in today’s criminal legal system. The Supreme Court has insinuated that the Confrontation
Clause does not apply at preliminary hearings, see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968),
and the state and lower courts have, for the most part, taken the Court’s hint, see supra note
64. Updating the Confrontation Clause does not require calling the holdings of those cases
into question. It does require questioning their dicta. See supra note 61.
194. E.g., Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012). For noncritical stages, defendants
can (constitutionally) be left to fare for themselves. Examples of noncritical stages include
photo identiﬁcations, see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317–18 (1973), and
handwriting exemplars, see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967).
195. See Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292, 297–316 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing Supreme Court
and Sixth Circuit cases). Drawing from the Court’s cases, the leading criminal procedure
treatise sets forth the following complex, multipart test for determining whether a stage is
critical:
In determining whether a judicial proceeding meets the “critical stage”
standard, a court must ask: (1) whether the proceeding either (i) had a
consequence adverse to the defendant as to the ultimate disposition of
the charge which could have been avoided or mitigated if defendant had
been represented by counsel at that proceeding, or (ii) offered a potential
opportunity for beneﬁtting the defendant as to the ultimate disposition
of the charge through rights that could have been exercised by counsel,
and (2) whether that adverse consequence could have been avoided, or
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Coleman v. Alabama: “The determination . . . depends . . . upon an analysis
‘whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in
the . . . confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice.’”196 The Court shed additional light on the meaning of a critical
stage in United States v. Wade, observing that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel reaches “pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle
the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”197
Combining Coleman and Wade, a “critical stage” is a proceeding where the
outcome of a defendant’s case may be prejudiced by not having a lawyer
at his side.198 By guaranteeing a defendant the assistance of counsel at
those proceedings, the Sixth Amendment (in Wade’s words) “assure[s]
that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our
adversary theory of criminal prosecution.”199
The same “adversary theory of criminal prosecution” animates the
Confrontation Clause.200 As the Court noted in Maryland v. Craig, the
Confrontation Clause’s purpose is “ensuring that evidence admitted
against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing
that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings.”201 That said,
the beneﬁts of adversarial process can be realized more easily in the
confrontation context than in the right to counsel arena. Whereas
defendants need counsel for every proceeding in which their rights are at
stake, they don’t need to repeatedly confront the government’s witnesses in
order to ascertain the strength (or lack thereof) of the government’s

the lost opportunity regained, by action that subsequently provided
counsel could have taken. Answering these inquiries will require a court
to examine various features of the procedural rules of the particular
jurisdiction.
3 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, Nancy J. King & Orin S. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 11.2(b)
(4th ed. 2019).
196. 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)).
197. 388 U.S. at 224.
198. See Van, 475 F.3d at 313 (“In order to assess if a given portion of a criminal
proceeding is a critical stage, we must ask how likely it is that signiﬁcant consequences might
have resulted from the absence of counsel at the stage of the criminal proceeding.”).
199. 388 U.S. at 227.
200. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (“The common-law tradition
is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law condones
examination in private by judicial officers.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 557, 585–86 (1988)
(“[W]hile confrontation, in its service to the adversary system, may concomitantly advance
the truth-determining process, confrontation’s mission, like the mission of other sixth
amendment rights, is to help guarantee the adversary system.”); see also Mosteller,
Confrontation of Witnesses, supra note 180, at 514 (explaining that “the positive procedural
goal of the confrontation right” is “encouraging and ensuring that evidence is presented in
the courtroom in the presence of the accused and subject to adversarial testing”).
201. 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990).
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case.202 In the context of confrontation, the “adversary theory of criminal
prosecution” means that a defendant must have the opportunity to test
the government’s witnesses at some point before or during the
adjudication that actually resolves his case. Hence a “critical adjudication”
standard. Just as the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a
lawyer at each critical stage, it should be understood to guarantee the
confrontation of the witnesses against them in adjudications that “might
well settle [their] fate.”203
So which parts of modern criminal procedure count as “critical
adjudications”? Trials count, of course. They may not happen very often,
but when they do, they certainly “settle the accused’s fate,” subject to
appeal. Preliminary hearings don’t count. As the Supreme Court observed
in Barber v. Page, a “preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching
exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its
function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause
exists to hold the accused for trial.”204 A similar logic would probably apply
as to other pretrial hearings (e.g., suppression hearings) that do not
implicate the ultimate merits of a case.205
Then there is plea bargaining. Even a glance at the contemporary
criminal legal system should leave no doubt about its status. The Supreme
Court has already told us that plea bargaining is the adjudication that
matters for almost every defendant. In a passage of Frye that we encounter
in Part I, the Court was forthright about that fact, observing that “ours ‘is
for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,’” such that “the
negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost
always the critical point for a defendant.”206 And within the plea
bargaining system, the key adjudicators are prosecutors. As Gerard Lynch
(now a Second Circuit Senior Judge) wrote in an inﬂuential article, an
“alien anthropologist” sent from Mars to study our criminal legal system
would recognize that the “substantive evaluation of the evidence and
assessment of the defendant’s responsibility . . . in the office of the
prosecutor” is the “actual adjudication process for criminal cases.”207 If
you are persuaded that the confrontation right should apply to critical

202. This is why, under Crawford, testimonial hearsay may be used at trial against a
defendant who has previously had the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See supra
note 49 and accompanying text.
203. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 224–27.
204. 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
205. See supra note 64.
206. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (quoting Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S.
156, 170 (2012)).
207. Lynch, Our Administrative System, supra note 26, at 2123; see also Rachel E.
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 876–77 (2009); Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The
Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33
Am. J. Crim. L. 223, 248 (2006).
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adjudications other than trial, extending it to plea bargaining should not
be a further stretch.
To be sure, there are practical difficulties in recognizing plea
bargaining as a “critical adjudication.” That’s because plea bargaining is an
informal process and the information on which participants rely can shift
quickly,208 making it tricky to determine whose statements the government has “used.” But there is a fixed point in the process: the criminal
charge. In the age of plea bargaining, a charge functions as the starting gun
for plea negotiations (except when they’ve begun already) and is a
prerequisite (or at least a corequisite) for any plea.209 My proposal thus
looks to the charge as the crucial moment for fixing Confrontation Clause
witnesses. In the age of plea bargaining, the confrontation right should
attach as to any person whose “testimony” the government relies on to
charge a defendant. For ease of discussion, I call these people the government’s “charging witnesses.”
The argument for this approach to the Confrontation Clause does not
depend on the notion that anyone in 1791, on either side of the Atlantic,
thought confrontation rights should apply to charging witnesses. The
argument is not originalist in that sense.210 That said, the approach is
208. See Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 553, 568 & n.77
(2013) (“Plea bargaining can be a dynamic process, and the parties can manipulate the
parts comprising the record of conviction all the way up to the moment that the disposition
is submitted to the court for approval.”); see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization,
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 Penn St. L. Rev. 1155, 1159
(2005).
209. See Brian M. Murray, Prosecutorial Responsibility and Collateral Consequences,
12 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 221 (2016) (“[P]rosecutors decide the charges from the start,
thereby setting the terms of the negotiation . . . .”). The parenthetical caveats in the text are
because plea negotiations sometimes begin before prosecutors ﬁle formal charges, even
during the pendency of an investigation. This is especially common in white-collar criminal
matters. See Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 Stan. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 61, 70 (2015).
210. There are plausible historical antecedents for a pretrial right to confrontation. In
the sixteenth century, Parliament enacted a statute providing that in treason cases, the
accusers, “at the tyme of the arraynement[,] . . . yf they be then livinge, shalbe brought in
pson before the partie soe accused.” 5 & 6 Edw. 6 c. 11, § 9 (1552) (Eng.). Similar provisions
appear at 1 & 2 Phil. & M. c. 10, § 11 (1554) (Eng.), and 13 Car. II, c. 1, § 5 (1661) (Eng.).
It is unclear, however, whether defendants were permitted to ask questions of the arraignment witnesses. A single (rather ambiguous) sentence from Matthew Hale suggests that they
were. 1 Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 306 (Sollom Emlyn ed.,
London, Nutt & Gosling 1736) (“[T]he statute requires, that [the witnesses] be produced
upon the arraignment in the presence of the prisoner to the end that he may cross examine
them.”). But this would be surprising in light of the (apparent) fact that cross-examination
by the defendant was uncommon even at trial in the Tudor era. See John Bellamy, The
Tudor Law of Treason: An Introduction 160 (1979). Another plausible antecedent for a
right to pretrial confrontation looks to the examinations conducted under the Marian bail
and committal statutes at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth
century. Robert Kry examined the records of more than two dozen such examinations used
in London trials in 1789. Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes—A
Response to Professor Davies, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 493, 513–16 (2007). Based on that review
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consistent with the historical practice of confrontation in precisely the
same way that the Court’s approach in Laﬂer and Frye was consistent with
the historical practices surrounding the right to counsel.211 Part I explains
that the Supreme Court “translated” the Sixth Amendment Counsel
Clause (in the Lessig sense of translation), such that the meaning of the
clause in its original context—ensuring that defendants had the assistance
of counsel for the important part of their criminal cases—continues to
govern in an era where plea bargaining is the important part of criminal
cases.212 My approach to confrontation works just the same way.213
It makes sense that the Confrontation Clause, like the Counsel Clause,
began life as “basically a trial right.”214 In the criminal legal system of the
Founding, trial was the only kind of critical adjudication that the system
knew.215 Confrontation at trial thus fully satisﬁed the desire for adversarial
testing of the government’s witnesses. But meaning depends on context,216
and the relevant context has changed dramatically. For better or worse,
(and other legal materials of the era), Kry concluded that “Marian depositions were
routinely conducted in the prisoner’s presence” and that “[a]t some point before the
framing, that practice hardened into a procedural right.” Id. at 527; see also Thomas Y.
Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”: A Reply
to Mr. Kry, 72 Brook. L. Rev. 557, 569 (2007) (criticizing Kry’s analysis, sometimes harshly,
but acknowledging that Kry’s “description of the evolution of English Marian practice . . .
[is] plausible”). As with the earlier treason statutes, the availability of cross-examination is
less clear. Kry concludes that “at the time of the framing, the right to cross-examine at a
committal hearing was not ﬁrmly established.” Kry, supra, at 541. But, he continues, the
“post-framing” evidence for a right to cross-examination is clearer, as “[e]very reported
American decision to address the issue conditioned the admissibility of a committal
examination on presence, and in most cases expressly on opportunity to cross-examine.” Id.
at 551. Even so, it is difficult to say whether, in the early decades of the nineteenth century,
defendants had an affirmative right to cross-examination in Marian examinations or merely
a right not to have evidence from uncrossed examinations used against them at trial. Both
views can be found in Kry’s sources. Compare State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104
(Super. Cts. L. & Eq. 1794) (“[O]ur act of Assembly . . . clearly implies the depositions to
be read, must be taken in [the defendant’s] presence”), with People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289,
300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (“The legislature has thus carefully provided that the defendant
shall have the opportunity to cross-examine, and if that right is not enjoyed, the deposition
cannot be read in evidence against him on the trial.”). The Tudor/Stuart treason statutes
and the Marian examination procedure of the eighteenth and nineteenth century each
provided some kind of pretrial confrontation, but given the uncertainties surrounding crossexamination, I do not rely on either in making the case for updating the modern
confrontation right to account for plea bargaining.
211. See supra section I.B.
212. See supra notes 116–122 and accompanying text.
213. As noted above, my point is not to defend translation as a general approach to
constitutional interpretation. See supra note 122. I lack both the space and the inclination
to weigh in on that question. My claim is only that if translation is appropriate for the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, it’s appropriate for the Sixth Amendment confrontation right
as well.
214. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
215. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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our criminal legal system uses two kinds of critical adjudications—trials, in
a few cases, and plea bargains, in the rest. A criminal defendant’s access to
confrontation needn’t and shouldn’t hinge on which adjudicatory path
their case takes.
III. SIXTH AMENDMENT DEPOSITIONS
This Part introduces and seeks to justify “Sixth Amendment depositions”
as the mechanism for putting the updated Confrontation Clause into
practice. Section III.A makes the affirmative case for depositions. After
walking through how depositions would work, it argues that they would
lead to better-informed plea prices, making plea bargaining fairer and
more reliable. It also reﬂects brieﬂy on the irony that a constitutional
provision meant to end the practice of “trial by deposition” could, through
the twists and turns of history, come to actually require depositions in
criminal cases. Section III.B considers how a defendant’s right to conduct
Sixth Amendment depositions could be enforced. It suggests that an
exclusionary rule—under which prosecutors would be barred from calling
Sixth Amendment witnesses not made available for deposition—could be
an effective tool. Section III.C evaluates potential objections. Would depositions cost too much?217 Would they unduly burden witnesses?218 While
these are serious objections, they do not justify maintaining the status
quo, which denies the confrontation right to the vast majority of criminal defendants. Section III.C also considers whether depositions would
become just one more thing for prosecutors and defendants to negotiate
about.219 Would prosecutors demand that defendants waive depositions in
exchange for a plea? In some cases, of course, they would, or they would
try. But we know empirically that defendants do regularly exercise their
pretrial rights, for instance when they move to suppress unconstitutional
searches. The same would likely be true of depositions. Defendants would
take depositions in cases where depositions would be valuable and trade
them in cases where they would not.
A.

Confrontation by Deposition

We have seen that the Sixth Amendment confrontation right should
attach as to any “witness” whose testimonial hearsay the government relies
on to charge a criminal defendant (i.e., the government’s “charging
witnesses”).220 The question remains: What does the updated confrontation right entitle defendants to do? The answer, of course, is crossexamination.221 But when? At what point in a criminal proceeding should
217. See infra section III.C.1.
218. See infra section III.C.2.
219. See infra section III.C.3.
220. See supra Part II.
221. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (“[The Confrontation Clause]
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
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defendants be entitled to cross-examine the government’s charging
witnesses?
We can dispense with an implausible option—that cross-examination
of the government’s charging witnesses at trial is sufficient. As a practical
matter, that option renders the Confrontation Clause once again ineffectual, given the tiny percentage of criminal cases that go to trial.222
As the Court noted in Frye, “[I]t is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial
process.”223 To be sure, for cases that actually make it to trial, in-court
cross-examination of the government’s witnesses would satisfy the
adversarial testing purpose of the Confrontation Clause. But there is no
good reason to design a rule that accomplishes its mission in a small
fraction of the cases and leaves the others untouched.
A pretrial right of confrontation demands a pretrial procedural
vehicle. The natural candidate is a deposition.224 At a deposition, lawyers
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”); Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth
Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 706 (1996) (characterizing cross-examination
as a right “at the heart of the Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clauses”); Richard D.
Friedman, Anchors and Flotsam: Is Evidence Law “Adrift”?, 107 Yale L.J. 1921, 1939 (1998)
(describing cross-examination as a right “underlying the Confrontation Clause”). That’s not
to say, of course, that cross-examination is the Confrontation Clause’s sole concern. See
Friedman, Meaning of Testimonial, supra note 63, at 257.
222. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
223. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012).
224. Another option would be to harness an existing procedural mechanism—the
preliminary hearing—for the purpose. The way in which preliminary hearings are currently
structured, however, poses difficulties. For one, preliminary hearings are constitutionally
required only for charges ﬁled by information, not by grand jury indictment. See 4 LaFave
et al., supra note 195, § 14.2(d). A bigger problem is prosecutors are not obligated to call
every witness at a preliminary hearing whose testimonial statements they used to charge, but
only enough to satisfy a minimal evidentiary threshold. See Abraham S. Goldstein, The State
and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1183
(1960). The purpose of a preliminary hearing, moreover, is not to probe the strengths and
weaknesses of the prosecution’s case. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). To be
sure, it would be possible to reengineer the preliminary hearing so that it would provide
pretrial confrontation. Indeed, something like this has been done in Great Britain in the
modern era. See William J. Knudsen, Jr., Pretrial Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury
Testimony, 48 Wash. L. Rev. 423, 429 (1973). Such a reengineered preliminary hearing
would look a lot like the depositions proposed in this section, but likely with two differences.
One is that there would be a judge or magistrate present, which would tend to increase the
cost of pretrial confrontation. The other is that preliminary hearings, unlike depositions,
are open to the public. This has both costs and beneﬁts. On the one hand, as we will see
below, there is reason to think that private depositions are less taxing on vulnerable crime
victims than testifying in open court. See infra note 315 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, those emphasizing the dignitary interests of the Confrontation Clause may see
an advantage to face-to-face confrontation between accuser and defendant happening in a
public forum. On the Confrontation Clause as serving dignitary interests, see Sherman J.
Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause, 81 Neb. L. Rev. 1258,
1270–71 (2003); Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 Fla.
L. Rev. 863, 897–917 (1988).
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examine a witness under oath in the presence of a court reporter.
Depositions are an essential element of pretrial civil discovery, but they are
rarely used or even available in criminal cases.225 This Essay’s approach to
the Confrontation Clause would change that. In an era where plea
bargaining is the dominant mode of adjudication, the Sixth Amendment
should guarantee criminal defendants the opportunity to depose the
government’s charging witnesses.
How might these “Sixth Amendment depositions” work as a practical
matter? The ﬁrst step would be for the prosecutor to identify the
“witnesses” whose testimonial statements she relied on to charge the
defendant.226 Some jurisdictions already require prosecutors to do something like this. In Iowa, for instance, when returning a formal charge, the
prosecutor must attach a “minutes of evidence” containing “the name and
occupation of the witness upon whose testimony” the “indictment is
found” or the “information is based.”227 Jurisdictions without such a mechanism would need to develop a procedural vehicle for prosecutors to
disclose their charging witnesses.228
After the government named its charging witnesses—and after any
motions practice about whether those witnesses’ statements qualify as
testimonial—the defendant would be entitled to take depositions. In civil
litigation, depositions are of two basic types—perpetuation and discovery.229 Perpetuation depositions are conducted to “perpetuate” testimony
when a witness is expected to be unavailable at trial.230 Discovery
depositions, as their name suggests, are tools for discovering new information from or about the deponent.231 Functionally, Sixth Amendment
depositions would work much like discovery depositions. That is, defense
lawyers would probe the government’s charging witnesses to test their
testimony. Prosecutors could attend as well to interpose objections and ask

225. 5 LaFave et al., supra note 195, § 20.2(e).
226. The details of Sixth Amendment deposition procedure would need to be worked
out over time. This Essay’s goal is simply to provide a procedural sketch sufficient to show
that Sixth Amendment depositions are practically feasible.
227. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.4, 2.5(3). Iowa is one of a handful of states that currently permit
discovery depositions in criminal cases. These state practices are discussed below. See infra
note 284 and accompanying text.
228. Further discussion of the government’s obligation to disclose witnesses, and how
to enforce it, appears in section III.B.
229. See Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70
Ind. L.J. 845, 856 (1995) (distinguishing perpetuation and discovery depositions).
230. In a pre-Crawford article, John Douglass argued that expanded use of these kinds
of depositions would advance Confrontation Clause values. See Douglass, Beyond
Admissibility, supra note 30, at 269–70.
231. See generally John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68
Fordham L. Rev. 2097, 2188–89 (2000) [hereinafter Douglass, Balancing Hearsay]
(describing discovery depositions).
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questions of their own.232 Prosecutors do not, of course, represent victims
or other witnesses,233 so jurisdictions would need to decide whether to
permit the deponent to bring a lawyer.234 Except in cases where the
deponent had some sort of personal exposure in the matter, though, a
lawyer for the deponent would, at least ordinarily, probably not be
necessary.
Sixth Amendment depositions would differ from discovery depositions in two key respects. First, only “charging witnesses” would be
required to sit for depositions. That means that Sixth Amendment
depositions would not be a tool to discover exculpatory information from
witnesses overlooked by law enforcement. Further, among people who did
provide information to law enforcement, only those who made
“testimonial” statements would be subject to deposition. People who sat
for ordinary police interrogations could be deposed, as could police
officers who made oral or written reports to prosecutors, but not
individuals who spoke to the police with the “primary purpose” of
handling an ongoing emergency;235 people who made statements in
informal contexts;236 or (probably) very young children.237 These limitations mean that a Sixth Amendment deposition regime would be more
limited, and less costly, than a discovery deposition regime.
Second, Sixth Amendment depositions and discovery depositions
have different purposes. The ostensible purpose of a discovery deposition

232. Because these witnesses would often be aligned with the prosecution (and thus
amenable to speaking with the prosecutor informally), such cross-examination might be
rare. That would be consistent with practice in civil litigation, where “counsel [frequently]
will choose not to cross-examine one of their own witnesses during the witness’s deposition.”
See 1 Steven G. Gensler & Lumen N. Mulligan, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and
Commentary Rule 32 cmt. (Feb. 2020 update).
233. See Laurie L. Levenson, Post-Conviction Death Penalty Investigations: The Need
for Independent Investigators, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. S225, S241 (2011).
234. Permitting the nonparty deponent to bring an attorney would be consistent with
the “general rule” in civil litigation. Women in City Gov’t United v. City of New York, 112
F.R.D. 29, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“As a general rule, a person being deposed, whether a party
or a non-party witness, is entitled to have counsel present at his deposition. This rule is
intended to allow the deponent to intelligently exercise testimonial privileges—chief among
them being the privilege against compulsory self incrimination.”). In Florida, one of the few
states that permits discovery depositions in criminal cases, victim-witnesses are entitled to
have a victim advocate at their depositions. Fla. Stat. § 960.001(1)(q) (2020).
235. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 349 (2011) (holding that statements by a
shooting victim were not testimonial); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–30 (2006)
(holding that statements of certain 911 callers were not testimonial, depending on whether
circumstances indicated an ongoing emergency).
236. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“An off-hand, overheard remark
might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules,
but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted.”).
237. See Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2015) (“Statements by very young
children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause. Few preschool students
understand the details of our criminal justice system.”).
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is to prepare a case for trial.238 As the Supreme Court observed in 1947,
depositions under the then-new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure play “a
vital role in the preparation for trial,” helping to ensure that “civil trials in
the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark.”239 Though
Sixth Amendment depositions might sometimes be useful to defendants
as a trial preparation tool, that is incidental to their real function—
providing information useful in plea bargaining.
The core purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to deploy adversarial
testing of the government’s case to enhance the fairness and accuracy of
criminal adjudication.240 That is precisely what Sixth Amendment
depositions would do. “Accuracy,” in the context of plea bargaining,
means plea prices that reﬂect the likely outcomes of trials.241 That means
“higher prices” (longer sentences) for defendants without viable trial
defenses and “lower prices” (shorter sentences, noncarceral dispositions,
and dismissals) for defendants with a realistic prospect of acquittal at trial.
By closing a crucial information deﬁcit in plea bargaining, Sixth
Amendment depositions would make it possible for plea prices to more
accurately track what would happen at a hypothetical trial.
Witness testimony is the heart of many, if not all, criminal trials.242 As
an experienced criminal defense lawyer observed in a trade publication,
“[E]ffective cross-examination that casts doubt on the credibility of a
witness is what wins cases, period.”243 Yet when lawyers negotiate plea
bargains, they usually have to speculate about the credibility and

238. See James W. McElhaney, Objecting at Depositions, Litigation, Summer 1988, at
51, 51–52 (“We use depositions for lots of purposes—to investigate the case, learn what the
witnesses will say, prepare them for trial, evaluate our opponent’s witnesses, give our own
cases a trial run, keep witnesses from changing their stories, and push our opponents toward
settlement.”). But see Steven Lubet, Showing Your Hand: A Counter-Intuitive Strategy for
Deposition Defense, Litigation, Winter 2003, at 38, 67 (“[I]t is simply an empirical error to
treat deposition defense as though its primary purpose is to prepare for trial. Instead, the
deposition should be recognized as a critical stage of an ongoing negotiation.”).
239. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
240. See supra notes 139, 200–201 and accompanying text.
241. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 2463, 2465 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Shadow of Trial] (“[T]he classic shadow-of-trial
model predicts that the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence
largely determine plea bargains.”). There is now a large literature on the many factors that
render actual plea outcomes “inaccurate” on this metric. See, e.g., id. at 2465–67
(describing factors—such as risk preferences, time discounting, agency costs, and poor
lawyering—that render the shadow-of-trial model overly simplistic); see also William
Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 511, 555 n.250 (2016) [hereinafter
Ortman, Probable Cause] (collecting sources).
242. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (observing that the “commonlaw tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing”).
243. Denis M. de Vlaming, Practice Points: Trying a Criminal Case: A Primer, Champion,
May 2005, at 46, 47.
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effectiveness of the accusatory witnesses.244 This information deﬁcit
impairs litigants’ ability to predict their chances of prevailing at trial, which
in turn distorts plea prices.245 If a defendant doesn’t know that the
prosecution’s eyewitness is partially blind, they may agree to an unduly
harsh plea.246 Conversely, if a defendant erroneously believes that the
government’s star cooperating witness can’t put together two coherent
sentences, they might refuse a plea deal that would be in their interest to
accept.
Now enter Sixth Amendment depositions. Pretrial depositions of the
government’s charging witnesses would improve the informational
ecosystem of plea negotiations in two principal ways. First, as the examples
above suggest, they would be a mechanism for both sides to acquire
information about the strengths and weaknesses of the government’s case.
Sometimes (as in the case of the eyewitness revealed to be partially blind)
the new information would strengthen the defendant’s hand in plea
negotiations, leading (ceteris paribus) to a lower plea price. In other cases
(like the supposedly bumbling cooperator revealed to be a polished
witness), the new information would redound to the prosecution’s beneﬁt,
leading to a higher plea price.247
Second, depositions would also have a signaling function. When a
defendant knows that a prosecution witness has a credibility problem, they
can use a deposition to signal that the problem exists and that they know
about it. In some cases, where the revelation is serious, prosecutors might
decide to dismiss the case.248 More often, the revelation would cut into the
prosecutor’s leverage, leading to a lower plea price.
Less intuitively, but perhaps more importantly, Sixth Amendment
depositions would be an opportunity for defense counsel to credibly signal

244. See Russell M. Gold, Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Civilizing
Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1607, 1625 (2017) (“The lack of access to evidence
often inhibits defendants from forming an accurate, independent assessment of their
likelihood of conviction to inform their bargaining positions.”); see also Bibas, Shadow of
Trial, supra note 241, at 2495 (“[I]nformation deﬁcits are much greater in plea bargaining
than in civil settlement negotiations.”).
245. On plea bargaining as “pricing,” see generally Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining
and Price Theory, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 920 (2016) (“[E]xamining the impact of the major
trends in criminal justice through the lens of price theory reveals how the state has managed
to manipulate the plea bargaining market . . . .”); Anne R. Traum, Fairly Pricing Guilty
Pleas, 58 How. L.J. 437 (2015) (describing how the imbalance between a defendant and a
prosecutor’s access to information can result in unfair pricing).
246. This example is inspired by one in Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of
Plea Bargaining, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 1303, 1338 (2018).
247. Depending on the thoroughness of the prosecutor’s precharge (or at least
predeposition) investigation, this information might be new to them too.
248. See Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield
to New Realities, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 541, 613 (“If the state ﬁnds that it cannot have conﬁdence
in its witnesses, for example, the prosecutor may decide to terminate the prosecution,
amend the charges to more accurately correspond to the evidence, or revise its plea offer.”).
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to their client that their case would have problems at trial.249 It is one thing
for a defense lawyer to relay a prosecutor’s insistence that a witness is
credible. It is a far different thing for a defendant to see the witness’s
credibility ﬁrsthand. Like the information-acquisition function, the signaling function of Sixth Amendment depositions would contribute to more
realistic assessments of what would happen if cases went to trial and, thus,
to fairer and more accurate plea prices.250
I have to acknowledge that there is a degree of irony to this proposal.
In Crawford, the Court pointed a ﬁnger at the English system of Marian
examinations (sometimes called depositions)251 as the very “abuse[]” that
the right of confrontation emerged to curtail.252 “[T]rial by deposition,”
Judge Nancy Gertner has observed, is “precisely what the Confrontation
Clause was designed to avoid.”253 Yet I am arguing that the Confrontation
Clause is not only compatible with depositions in criminal cases, but that
it requires them. How can that be? The surface answer is that it was never
the taking of depositions, but their use at trial, that brought constitutional
scorn.254 And even then, the Court in Crawford wasn’t concerned with
examinations (or depositions) full stop, but just ex parte ones.255

249. Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth? A Progress Report, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1990) (“Discovery serves other ends as
well. The most important of these subsidiary purposes, given courts’ crowded criminal
dockets, is that a guilty defendant is more likely to plea-bargain and plead if the prosecution
discloses to him a strong government case.”).
250. To be sure, there is a range of criminal cases in which even a revealing Sixth
Amendment deposition might not materially affect the parties’ plea bargaining leverage.
That’s because menus of overlapping criminal statutes with variable sentencing severity
sometimes give prosecutors so much leverage that a defendant’s probability of acquittal at
trial doesn’t ﬁgure meaningfully into the price of a plea. See Ortman, Second-Best, supra
note 77, at 1078–83 (“[W]hen criminal codes are stacked with overlapping offenses, pleas
are not negotiated ‘in the shadow of the law.’ . . . [F]or many crimes, the details of
substantive law are unlikely to affect plea outcomes.” (citing William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2548, 2250–52
(2004))). In those cases, even a Sixth Amendment deposition that uncovered a prosecution
witness’s serious credibility problems might not result in a more favorable plea offer. But
this dynamic does not apply in all cases. In high-stakes cases—homicides, for example—and
in cases where the government’s evidence is very weak, prosecutors lack leverage to set plea
prices unilaterally. Id. at 1081. These are cases in which Sixth Amendment depositions would
be particularly valuable.
251. See Davies, supra note 210, at 580 n.80 (describing and criticizing this
nomenclature).
252. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004) (“Through a series of statutory
and judicial reforms, English law developed a right of confrontation that limited these
abuses.”).
253. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D. Mass. 1998);
see also Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[A]llowing trial by deposition
violates both the literal language and the purpose of the Confrontation Clause . . . .”).
254. See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text.
255. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
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The surface answer isn’t wrong, but it’s not satisfying. The deeper
answer is that I am proposing a “second-best” approach to the Confrontation Clause.256 A criminal legal system in which the government’s
evidence is probed via cross-examination at trial may be the ideal (“ﬁrstbest”) constitutional ordering. In a world of trials, Sixth Amendment
depositions would be redundant, and maybe even wasteful. But our
criminal legal system has very few trials. If the values behind the
Confrontation Clause matter, it is better to test the government’s evidence
via depositions than to “adjudicate” cases with no adversarial testing at all.
In this way, Sixth Amendment depositions are a second-best response to a
criminal legal system in which trials have vanished.257
B.

Enforcing Sixth Amendment Depositions

As the previous section explained, the Sixth Amendment deposition
process would begin with the prosecutor disclosing the names of witnesses
they relied on to charge the defendant.258 The list would include those
who provided information directly to the prosecutor, as well as those who
are “witnesses” by virtue of making a testimonial statement to another
witness, such as a police officer. The government’s disclosure is necessary
(defendants cannot depose the government’s charging witnesses unless
they know who they are), but it introduces complications. One complication is that prosecutors might sometimes have a legitimate need to
keep a charging witness anonymous at the time they ﬁle an information or
indictment; that complication is addressed in the next section.259 Another
signiﬁcant complication—and the one addressed here—is that a
prosecutor might not be fully forthcoming in their witness disclosure. A
prosecutor who wanted to avoid a particular deposition might, that is,
leave a witness off the list.260 So we need an enforcement mechanism.
An exclusionary rule would be a useful, albeit incomplete, solution.
Absent special circumstances, prosecutors could be prohibited from
calling a witness at any proceeding that implicates the merits of the case
(such as a preliminary hearing or a trial) if the witness was (1) known to
the government when it ﬁled charges, but (2) not included in its disclosure
256. For background on the general theory of second best, see Ortman, Second-Best,
supra note 77, at 1062–65. For an illuminating discussion of second-best thinking in
constitutional interpretation, see Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 Ind.
L.J. 307, 311–12 (2008).
257. On the “vanishing” criminal trial, see Ortman, Second-Best, supra note 77, at
1062–63.
258. See supra notes 226–228 and accompanying text.
259. See infra section III.C.2.
260. The well-known problem of prosecutorial noncompliance with Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), suggests that this has to be taken seriously. See Bennett L. Gershman,
Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 531, 533
(2007) (“[V]iolations of Brady are the most recurring and pervasive of all constitutional
procedural violations, with disastrous consequences . . . .”).
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of charging witnesses.261 The point of such an exclusionary rule is not to
ensure fair preliminary hearings or trials, though that may be a side
beneﬁt. Rather, the point is to give prosecutors an incentive to be
comprehensive in their disclosures, lest an omission leave them without
their in-court witnesses when they need them.262
With an exclusionary rule, the government’s disclosure of its charging
witnesses would no longer present a ripe opportunity for gamesmanship.
When a prosecutor chooses not to include a witness they relied on to
charge the defendant, then (again, absent special circumstances) that
witness would simply be out of the case, permanently. The strength of the
witness’s inculpatory information would no longer be one of the factors
that prosecutors and defense lawyers need to take into account when
evaluating the government’s case.263 It would be as if the government’s
witness had never made a testimonial accusatory statement at all.
There would be circumstances where prosecutors knew, at the time
they charged a defendant, that a witness had made a testimonial statement
concerning the case but did not know that the statement was inculpatory
(or where they knew that it was inculpatory but not that it was reliable)
until later. And sometimes prosecutors would not even learn of a witness’s
existence until after they had charged the defendant. A question thus
arises about how to deal with these new or newly relevant witnesses. Should
the defendant have the opportunity to depose them? There are two
approaches the law could take on that question, and each has advantages
and disadvantages. As this Essay is the ﬁrst to make the case for Sixth
Amendment depositions, it seems unnecessary to take a ﬁrm position on
this subsidiary question. Instead, I’ll present the options.
One option—call it the “closed list” approach—is to make Sixth
Amendment depositions available only for witnesses disclosed when the
defendant is charged.264 The primary advantage of this approach is its
administrability. With a closed list, the number of potential depositions
would be ﬁxed from the inception of the case. If the defendant intended
to actually conduct depositions (as opposed to trading depositions for
leniency),265 those depositions could be completed, and their
261. In previous work I suggested a similar exclusionary rule to counter a different
problem in modern criminal procedure—the lack of precharge evidentiary scrutiny. See
Ortman, Probable Cause, supra note 241, at 567 n.323 (proposing “an exclusionary rule
providing that, absent special circumstances, at trial the government may only offer
evidence that it presented to the grand jury or screening magistrate”).
262. Cf. Erica Hashimoto, Motivating Constitutional Compliance, 68 Fla. L. Rev. 1001,
1010 (2016) (observing that “shaping . . . law enforcement incentives” is “the primary
purpose of the [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule”).
263. See supra notes 242–247 and accompanying text.
264. Note, however, that where the government ﬁles a superseding indictment or
information, new charges would require new disclosures. Even on the closed-list approach,
then, the universe of Sixth Amendment depositions wouldn’t be entirely ﬁxed upon the
ﬁling of the ﬁrst charges.
265. See infra section III.C.3.
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informational value incorporated into plea negotiations, by a date
(relatively) certain.
The closed list’s chief disadvantage is that it reintroduces the prospect
of prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors wishing to avoid depositions
might assert disingenuously that they did not rely on a particular witness
to charge the case, counting on the fact that they could point to some
intervening development as their reason for “reevaluating” that determination if the case went to trial. Even more dangerously, prosecutors might
cut precharging investigations short to intentionally avoid learning about
witnesses until after charges are ﬁled and the list of deposable witnesses
closed. Courts would have to develop rules to curtail such abuses. One
possibility would be a rebuttable presumption that prosecutors relied on
any witnesses whose inculpatory information they possessed or reasonably
should have possessed at the time of charging. That would put the burden
on prosecutors to defend their omissions.266 The trial court would hear the
prosecutor’s explanation and determine whether the person should have
been on the list of charging witnesses. If so, the court would enter an order
excluding the person (or the person’s testimonial hearsay) from any
subsequent trial or hearing going to the merits.
The second option—the “open list” approach—would allow the
prosecutor to amend her disclosure of charging witnesses prior to trial (or
some date close to trial), with the defendant acquiring the opportunity to
depose any witness added to the list.267 The theory would be that once the
government identiﬁes additional witnesses, they become part of the body
of evidence under which the defendant is charged. The advantages and
disadvantages of this approach are a mirror image of the advantages and
disadvantages of the closed list. The major advantage is that it (largely)
avoids the risk of prosecutorial manipulation. The prosecutor would gain
no advantage from holding back witnesses at the time of charging, because
the witnesses would have to be identiﬁed (and subjected to deposition)
later. Its chief disadvantage is that it would be practically unwieldly. The
deposition “phase” of litigation would have to be reopened every time the
prosecutor identiﬁed an additional witness. Moreover, depositions taken
as a trial date nears may be more about preparing a case for trial than
providing information useful for plea bargaining, and thus attenuated
from the rationale for having Sixth Amendment depositions in the ﬁrst

266. To the extent that the explanation relied on conﬁdential information involving an
ongoing law enforcement investigation, it might be provided in an “attorney’s eyes only”
context or even in an ex parte declaration from the prosecutor to the judge. See Ion Meyn,
The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 Am. J. Crim. L. 39, 86 (2014).
267. This is how it works in at least some of the states that permit criminal depositions.
See, e.g., State v. Damme, 522 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (affirming conviction
notwithstanding late-added witness where the “[d]efendant was given the opportunity to
depose the witness”).

2021] CONFRONTATION IN THE AGE OF PLEA BARGAINING

495

place.268 I leave it to future analysis to decide which set of advantages and
disadvantages is better.
C.

Objections

If you are with me so far—that is, if you agree that the right to depose
the government’s charging witnesses would update the Confrontation
Clause for the age of plea bargaining—you might still be worried about
the practicality or desirability of incorporating depositions into criminal
cases. This section is meant to assuage such concerns.
While this Essay is the ﬁrst to locate a right to depositions in criminal
cases in the Confrontation Clause, others have advocated for criminal
depositions on policy grounds, and still others have opposed them.269 One
of the sharpest objections to depositions in criminal cases was published
by a committee of the ABA in 1970. The committee articulated several
reasons for its opposition:
First, there is no inherent limitation of cost on the conduct of
unnecessary depositions, because in many cases the costs of the
defense must be borne by the state . . . . [Second,] the imposition
on civilian witnesses may discourage their coming forward in
criminal cases. And, ﬁnally, underlying the importance of these
considerations is the belief that depositions in addition to the
disclosures otherwise required by these standards will not be
necessary in most criminal cases. Under its responsibilities in
bringing a criminal case, the prosecution will ordinarily possess
written statements or transcripts of testimony of potential
witnesses of such completeness that additional interrogation by
the defense attorney, prior to trial, will be of only marginal value
in most cases.270
The subsections below address the ﬁrst two of these objections—that
criminal depositions would be too costly and that they would impede
268. See supra notes 240–242 and accompanying text.
269. For an overview of the debate, see generally John F. Yetter, Discovery Depositions
in Florida Criminal Proceedings: Should They Survive?, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 675 (1988).
Interesting recent calls for criminal depositions (on nonconstitutional, policy grounds)
include Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 1585, 1638–40 (2005) [hereinafter Brown, The
Decline]; Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 231, at 2187–92; Prosser, supra note 248,
at 607–13.
270. Standards Relating to Discovery & Proc. Before Trial § 2.5 cmt. at 87 (Am. Bar
Ass’n, Approved Draft 1970). The quoted text omits one other objection advanced by the
ABA committee: “[I]f stated as a right, the need to take depositions might be construed as
part of the adequacy of representation required by the constitutional right to counsel.” Id.
This objection is quite peculiar. It is true that if criminal defendants have a right to take
depositions, then competent defense counsel would, under some circumstances, have the
duty to assist their clients by conducting them. Sixth Amendment depositions would not be
necessary in every case; sometimes, the best and highest use of the right would be to trade
it away in plea bargaining. See infra section III.C.3. But yes, of course, it would sometimes
be a defense attorney’s duty to take depositions.
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witnesses. A ﬁnal subsection deals with an objection the committee did not
raise—that depositions would just become just another bargaining chip
for prosecutors and defense lawyers to wrangle over.
Before turning to those serious concerns, however, a word on the ABA
committee’s remaining critique—that criminal depositions are unnecessary because the “written statements” of government witnesses are reliable
enough. If you read section II.A of this Essay, the ABA’s ﬁnal objection
may sound familiar, as it picks up just where the judges who tried Sir Walter
Raleigh left off.271 It is hard to conjure an outlook more antithetical to the
values underlying the Confrontation Clause. As the Supreme Court
observed in Crawford (channeling an important Antifederalist): “[W]ritten
evidence . . . [is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex parte [sic],
and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.”272
1. Resource Considerations. — One persistent objection to depositions
in criminal cases is that they would be too expensive.273 Opponents point
out that the state must pay not only for the costs of prosecutors (and often
public defenders) to attend but also for the time of law enforcement
officers called to sit for depositions.274 On one level, this objection rings
true—depositions are not free.275 Of course, that could be said about
almost any rule or procedure involved in the criminal legal system.
Requiring police officers to write out affidavits to secure search warrants is
expensive.276 So is providing lawyers for indigent defendants.277 Trials are
really expensive,278 as are appeals,279 as are collateral proceedings attacking
convictions.280 That something isn’t free tells us virtually nothing about
whether it is worthwhile.281
271. See supra notes 156–158, 161 and accompanying text.
272. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 49 (2004) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard Henry Lee, Letter IV by the Federal Farmer,
reprinted in 1 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 469, 473 (Leon
Friedman, Karyn Gullen Browne, Joan Tapper, Betsy Nicolaus, Christine Pinches & Jeanne
Brody eds., 1971) (misquotation)).
273. See Douglass, Balancing Hearsay, supra note 231, at 2190 (describing objections to
discovery depositions); Prosser, supra note 248, at 613 (same).
274. See Yetter, supra note 269, at 684.
275. See Ortman, Second-Best, supra note 77, at 1101.
276. See William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 842, 848 (2001).
277. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon’s Paradox, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 955, 960–61 (2004).
278. See Bibas, Shadow of Trial, supra note 241, at 2504 n.166 (“Even a slam-dunk trial
imposes signiﬁcant costs on the court and lawyers . . . .”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz,
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1932 (1992) (“Trials are elaborate and costly
affairs.”).
279. See Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 Duke J.
Compar. & Int’l L. 1, 10 (2011).
280. See Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral
Review, 4 Wake Forest J.L. & Pol’y 179, 185 (2014).
281. See Prosser, supra note 248, at 613 (contending that arguments about the costs of
depositions “ignore the signiﬁcant truth-seeking value of criminal depositions”). The ideal
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Perhaps, then, the objection is really that depositions would be
impractically expensive. If so, the objection has a ready answer. Sixth
Amendment depositions would, as suggested above, be functionally
similar to discovery depositions.282 Though most states do not afford
criminal defendants the opportunity to conduct discovery depositions, a
handful do, and they seem no worse for the wear.283 The procedural details
vary, but in at least six states—Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, North
Dakota, and Vermont—criminal defendants may depose prosecution
witnesses as a matter of right.284 Some of these states are thinly populated,
and perhaps their experience is not generalizable.285 Florida is the third
largest state by population, so it makes sense to focus there.286
Florida has permitted criminal defendants to take discovery
depositions as a matter of right for almost half a century.287 At least twice
in that time, criminal depositions have come under political attack by law
enforcement interests.288 In 1988, a coalition of Florida’s elected
prosecutors, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, police
departments, and organizations representing crime victims attempted to
have depositions abolished.289 They estimated that depositions cost the

way to address the question would be through cost-beneﬁt analysis. But analyzing the costs
and beneﬁts of a procedural mechanism that does not yet exist is probably impossible. My
aim for this section is more modest—to show that Sixth Amendment depositions are not
impractical. In other words, I hope to show that courts would not be dooming (or further
dooming) the criminal legal system if they adopted my proposed approach to confrontation.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 231–232.
283. See George C. Thomas III, Two Windows into Innocence, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L.
575, 592–601 (2010) (examining the frequency and costs associated with discovery
depositions in various states).
284. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.220(h); Ind. Code § 35-37-4-3 (2020); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.13;
Mo. R. Crim. P. 25.12; N.D. R. Crim. P. 15(a)(2); Vt. R. Crim. P. 15; see also Darryl K. Brown,
Discovery, in 3 Reforming Criminal Justice 147, 156 & n.29 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). In a
handful of other states, defendants may be allowed deposition based on a showing of good
cause, or something akin to it. See Prosser, supra note 248, at 609 (“In [some jurisdictions],
such as Texas, Nebraska, and New Hampshire, the defendant must make a showing of the
need for the deposition.”); Thomas, supra note 283, at 592–98 (“[S]ix states . . . permit[]
defendants to depose all prosecution witnesses and ﬁve others . . . permit[] discovery upon
leave of the court.”).
285. Thomas, supra note 283, at 592–93 (“A discovery process that might work just ﬁne
in Vermont could pose an administrative nightmare in a more populous state. Indeed, of
the six states that permit defendants to depose all prosecution witnesses, four of them are
primarily rural—Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, and Vermont.”).
286. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Florida Passes New York to Become the Nation’s
Third Most Populous State, Census Bureau Reports (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.census.gov/
newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-232.html [https://perma.cc/P3RR-URQL]. In highlighting Florida, I am following George Thomas’s lead. See Thomas, supra note 283, at 593.
287. Yetter, supra note 269, at 680–81 (explaining the origins of Florida’s discovery
deposition procedure in 1972).
288. On prosecutorial opposition to depositions generally, see Ion Meyn, The Haves of
Procedure, 60 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1765, 1819 (2019).
289. Yetter, supra note 269, at 684.
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state more than $35 million annually in attorney and police officer time.290
The legislature directed the state’s supreme court to look into the matter,
and the court assigned the task to a commission.291 The commission
reported back that while some tinkering with the procedural details would
be useful, depositions “make a unique and signiﬁcant contribution to a
fair and economically efficient determination of factual issues in the
criminal process” and “should be retained as part of Florida’s Criminal
Justice process and . . . not abolished or signiﬁcantly curtailed.”292 A
strikingly similar process played out in 1996, when a coalition that included
the state’s Attorney General, twenty of its elected state’s attorneys, all
three United States Attorneys, and a host of organizations representing
police officers and prosecutors again attempted to persuade the legislature
or the state supreme court to abolish criminal depositions.293 And again,
while the abolitionists succeeded in getting some minor procedural
reforms, the system of depositions proved resilient to their attacks.294
The coalitions seeking to abolish Florida criminal depositions in 1988
and 1996 were not lacking for political inﬂuence. Prosecutors tend to get
their way on matters of criminal justice policy.295 If they had a good case to
make that criminal depositions in Florida were impractically expensive,
one can reasonably expect that they would have made it.296 Yet these
coalitions failed in their efforts to abolish depositions twice in less than ten
years. Their failure is circumstantial evidence that criminal depositions are
not impractical in Florida. That, in turn, is evidence—again circumstantial—

290. Id.
291. Id. at 675–76.
292. Id. at add. at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crim. Discovery
Comm’n, Report of the Florida Supreme Court’s Commission on Criminal Discovery 20
(1989)).
293. See Howard Dimmig, Deposition Reform: Is the Cure Worse than the Problem?,
Fla. Bar J., July–Aug. 1997, at 52, 53–55.
294. Id.
295. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 727–28 (2005)
(noting that “one of the most . . . powerful lobbying groups in criminal law consists of those
exercising the penal power: law enforcement and, in particular, prosecutors”); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 534 (2001)
(explaining that “legislators have good reason to listen when prosecutors urge some
statutory change” and describing this dynamic as “the single most important feature for
deﬁning criminal law”). But see Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
171, 207–08 (2019) (noting that “[t]he mechanism by which prosecutorial lobbying
inﬂuences criminal law is unclear” and arguing that “[w]hat commentators think of as
effective prosecutor lobbying may, in fact, be a shared interest among prosecutors and
lawmakers”).
296. The law enforcement coalition estimated that “in 1987, discovery depositions cost
police departments statewide 750,000 lost police man hours.” Thomas, supra note 283, at
594. Noting that there were approximately 350,000 serious crimes in Florida that year,
George Thomas calculates that this amounts to “about two police hours per case.” Id.
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that recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to depositions wouldn’t overwhelm our criminal legal systems.297 If Florida can do it, so can the rest of us.
2. Conﬁdential Informants and Vulnerable Witnesses. — A more
substantial policy objection to depositions in criminal cases focuses on
their effects on witnesses. Witnesses may be “discouraged” (the ABA
committee’s term) from reporting crimes to police if they know that they
will have to undergo a deposition.298 Relatedly, defense lawyers might use
depositions to “harass” witnesses by asking about embarrassing or otherwise private matters.299 And defendants themselves, armed with knowledge
of the witnesses against them and their testimony, might—in the words of
an oft-cited New Jersey Supreme Court decision—“take steps to bribe or
frighten [witnesses] into giving perjured testimony or into absenting
themselves so they are unavailable to testify.”300
As applied to ordinary prosecution witnesses, these concerns look like
thin pretexts for denying criminal defendants the information-gathering
tools possessed by civil litigants. In an inﬂuential address on criminal discovery generally, Justice William Brennan refuted several of them.301 To
the possibility that defendants might use discovery tools to harm witnesses
or bully them into not testifying, Brennan replied that while “there have
been instances where this has happened,” it could and should be handled
on a case-by-case basis.302 And as for the “old hobgoblin perjury,” Brennan
wrote: “I should think . . . that its complete fallacy has been starkly exposed
through the extensive and analogous experience in civil causes where
liberal discovery has been allowed and perjury has not been fostered.”303
Because he did not focus on depositions, Brennan did not have
reason to consider the possibility that defense lawyers would, by asking
harassing questions at depositions, discourage witnesses from testifying.
The line between harassing deposition questions and probative deposition questions, though, depends on one’s vantage point. Imagine that a
defense lawyer is deposing an eyewitness to a bank robbery who called a
police tip line promising a $5,000 reward for information leading to an
arrest. From the witness’s perspective, the lawyer’s questions about their
297. Id. at 601 (concluding, based on the experience of Florida and other states that
have tried criminal depositions, that incorporating depositions into criminal practice is
“achievable”).
298. See Standards Relating to Discovery & Proc. Before Trial, supra note 270, at § 2.5
cmt. at 87.
299. See Yetter, supra note 269, at 685 (describing the argument of deposition
“abolitionists” in Florida).
300. State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1953).
301. See Brennan, supra note 249, at 290–94.
302. Id. at 292.
303. Id. at 291; see also Rand N. White & Tom E. Wilson, Note, The Preliminary Hearing
in California: Adaptive Procedures in a Plea Bargain System of Criminal Justice, 28 Stan. L.
Rev. 1207, 1235 (1976) (explaining that the experience of civil depositions “deﬂates the
proposition that a correlation exists between expanded use of the deposition and unlawful
conduct”).
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child’s medical bills will undoubtedly feel like harassment. From the
lawyer’s perspective, the questions are essential to determining whether
the monetary reward biased the accusation.
Witness-related objections to criminal depositions have more force if
we focus on two speciﬁc types of prosecution witnesses: conﬁdential law
enforcement witnesses, on the one hand, and crime victims, especially
vulnerable victims of crimes involving sexual and domestic violence, on
the other.
a. Conﬁdential Witnesses. — Prosecutors may object that depositions of
conﬁdential informants and undercover law enforcement agents would
risk witness safety.304 This objection is not entirely without merit.305
Conﬁdential informants and undercover agents whose testimonial hearsay
prosecutors rely on would be subject to deposition under my proposal.
Their identity would thus need to be disclosed to defendants at an earlier
point in the criminal process than it is today. In some cases, the change in
timing could implicate legitimate law enforcement interests.306 That might
happen, for instance, when a conﬁdential informant is still conducting
controlled drug buys on other targets, or where an undercover agent stays
in the ﬁeld after charges are ﬁled against some, but not all, members of a
criminal conspiracy.
In the unusual case where the timing of the disclosure implicates
legitimate law enforcement interests, there are a number of things courts
could do. The simplest option would be to delay depositions until the
relevant law enforcement activities were complete, but this will not always
be possible.307 Courts have allowed witnesses to testify anonymously even
at trials,308 and anonymous depositions—using, for instance, screens and
voice disguising technology—could be an option in extreme cases. Or the
witness’s identity might be kept secret from the defendant, but disclosed
to his lawyer under a protective order. It is even possible that a defendant

304. I am grateful to Darryl Brown for suggesting this point.
305. Informants who provided background information that does not form part of the
corpus of the government’s evidence against a defendant would, however, remain out of
sight. See generally United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (describing
the “informant’s privilege,” which “allows the Government to refuse to disclose the identity
of a person who has furnished information about criminal activities”).
306. See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, Colum. L. Rev. 1, 55 (2015) (“[I]nformation
that enables one defendant to warn his compatriots that they are investigative targets also
harms society.”); Brown, The Decline, supra note 269, at 1622 (“In some contexts
[especially federal practice], information disclosure might compromise ongoing
investigations based on conﬁdential government information, such as informant identities.
It could also facilitate defendant perjury.”).
307. This approach may be problematic where the defendant is detained pending trial,
as delaying depositions could extend the period of pretrial conﬁnement.
308. See United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez, 761 F.3d 1123, 1139–47 (10th Cir. 2014)
(using a two-prong framework to evaluate whether “anonymous” trial testimony violates the
Confrontation Clause).
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could be excluded altogether from a particularly sensitive deposition
conducted by his lawyer, though this would raise additional difficulties.309
b. Victims/Vulnerable Witnesses. — The other category of witnesses for
whom depositions pose special concerns are victims (and potentially other
witnesses) of violent crime. George Thomas explains the difficulty:
“Depositions are traumatic experiences for all witnesses and more so for
victims of crime, particularly violent crime, because they must relive the
incident and also must face aggressive questioning.”310 There’s no denying
that recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to depositions in criminal cases
would impose additional burdens on crime victims, including the victims
of sexual and domestic violence.311 There are, however, a few reasons why
those burdens may be less extensive than they ﬁrst appear.
First, it is signiﬁcant that the right to Sixth Amendment depositions
would extend only to those who have made “testimonial” statements. After
Ohio v. Clark, that limitation means there would probably not be Sixth
Amendment depositions of very young children, an important subcategory
of vulnerable crime victims.312 It also means that there would not be Sixth
Amendment depositions of victims who provided information to police
under circumstances where the “primary purpose” of the interrogation
was to deal with an ongoing emergency.313 As noted earlier, the reach of
Sixth Amendment depositions would be narrower than the reach of
ordinary discovery depositions.314
Second, there is reason to think that deposition testimony is less
traumatic than trial testimony. In a 2005 article on Crawford’s impact in
domestic violence cases, Tom Lininger quotes a technical assistance
packet prepared by Nicole Lindenmyer of the Battered Women’s Legal
Advocacy Project: “Depositions are usually less stressful” than testifying at

309. Excluding the defendant altogether poses a knotty legal question. On one hand,
personal presence at trial is a core component of the Confrontation Clause. See Illinois v.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970) (“One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of
his trial.”). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious whether adversarial testing at a deposition
depends on the defendant’s personal presence. I see reasonable arguments on both sides
and leave the question to future analysis.
310. Thomas, supra note 283, at 598.
311. See Gold et al., supra note 244, at 1648 (“[Vulnerable] witnesses and victims
already face the emotional turmoil of having to tell their stories at trial, and allowing them
to be deposed would force them to experience that trauma twice in the criminal process.”).
312. 576 U.S. 237, 247–48 (2015) (“Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever,
implicate the Confrontation Clause. Few preschool students understand the details of our
criminal justice system.”).
313. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828–30 (2006) (holding that where the “primary
purpose” of an interrogation “was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency,” the declarant’s statement was nontestimonial).
314. See supra notes 235–237 and accompanying text.
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trial, Lindenmyer noted, “because the victim may have her own attorney
present, and she can take breaks as often as needed.”315
Third, so long as Maryland v. Craig remains good law,316 steps could
be taken to ensure that vulnerable witnesses are not physically in the
deposition room with defendants.317 In Craig, the Court approved the trial
testimony of a child-witness using a one-way video system in which the
defendant could see the witness, but the witness could not see the
defendant.318 The argument for procedures like the one approved in Craig
would be even stronger in depositions than in trials, as there is no risk that
the technique could prejudice the defendant in a jury’s eyes. Upon a “casespeciﬁc” ﬁnding of “necessity,”319 Sixth Amendment depositions could
proceed with the defendant watching by video from a separate location.
With real-time video, defendants could even suggest lines of questioning
to counsel electronically or during breaks.320 Depositions taken under
these circumstances would allow for adversarial testing of the
government’s case without subjecting vulnerable witnesses to the trauma
of being in a small room with the defendant.
To be sure, these are points in mitigation—it remains true that Sixth
Amendment depositions would impose burdens on crime victims,
including vulnerable ones. Those costs are the unfortunate byproduct of
an adversarial system of criminal justice.321 Maybe we would be better off
with an inquisitorial system where factﬁnding is left to a neutral arbiter

315. Lininger, supra note 79, at 796 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Nicole A.F. Lindenmyer, Washington v. Crawford: Must Crime Victims Testify Against the
Defendant?, Battered Women’s Legal Advocacy Project Technical Assistance Packet 4
(2004)); see also Mosteller, Confrontation of Witnesses, supra note 180, at 610 (noting that
victims may be more willing to testify at “the outset of the prosecution”).
316. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). At the moment, Craig is good law. See 6 LaFave et al., supra
note 195, § 24.2(e) & n.101. It may be hanging on by a thread. See Mary Fan, Adversarial
Justice’s Casualties: Defending Victim-Witness Protection, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 775, 806 (2014)
(noting that after Crawford, “the continued viability of Craig . . . is unclear”); Richard D.
Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev.
439, 454 (“The categorical nature of [Justice Scalia’s] opinion in Crawford squares better
with his Craig dissent than with Justice O’Connor’s looser majority opinion in Craig.”).
317. Of course, if criminal defendants are not entitled to be personally present at
depositions, see supra note 309, the Craig point is moot.
318. Craig, 497 U.S. at 841–42.
319. Id. at 855.
320. Id. at 840–42 (explaining that the defendant maintained “electronic
communication with defense counsel” throughout the child-witness’s testimony).
321. The Court addressed this issue squarely in Coy v. Iowa: “That face-to-face presence
may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim or abused child; but by the same token it
may confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult.
It is a truism that constitutional protections have costs.” 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988).
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rather than to the clash of dueling advocates.322 Maybe not.323 But for
better or worse, we have a system that depends on adversarial testing, yet
does not do adversarial testing. That’s the void that we need Sixth
Amendment depositions to ﬁll.
3. Confrontation as Unbundled Bargaining Chip. — Like nearly all
criminal procedure rights,324 Sixth Amendment depositions would be
waivable.325 Does that mean that they would inevitably become just one
more chip for defense lawyers or prosecutors to use in bargaining? Yes, to
an extent. As Anne Traum observes, “In guilty plea adjudication,
defendants do not so much exercise constitutional rights as convert them
to bargaining chips to use in the plea-bargaining process.”326 In some
situations, defendants might trade their right to conduct depositions for a
reduced charge or sentence. In others, prosecutors might penalize a
defendant who insisted on taking depositions by, for instance, adding
charges onto their case.327 The inevitable emergence of a “market” for
322. See Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect the
Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness,
36 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 319, 353 (2011) (“As to whether the adversarial or
inquisitorial model is superior in factﬁnding, new empirical evidence supports the
theoretical superiority of inquisitorial side.”); Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More
Truthful, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 95, 143–44 (1996) (“As opposed to the adversary system, the
inquisitorial system trial is remarkably unencumbered in its search for truth.”).
323. See Gerald Walpin, America’s Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do
Justice, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 175, 175 (2003) (“The Article advocates for America’s
adversarial and jury systems because they are logically superior and, in my experience, they
most often succeed in rendering justice.”).
324. See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200–01 (1995) (“Rather than
deeming waiver presumptively unavailable absent some sort of express enabling clause, we
instead have adhered to the opposite presumption.”); see also William J. Stuntz, Waiving
Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va. L. Rev. 761, 772 n.28 (1989) (“For reasons that are
not altogether clear, courts have never seriously considered the possibility of making
criminal defendants’ rights nonwaivable.”).
325. It would be unwise to make Sixth Amendment depositions nonwaivable, as we
would not want a rule that requires (for instance) a child-sex-abuse defendant to take the
victim’s deposition. A closer “waivability” question concerns the prosecutor’s disclosure of
their charging witnesses. See supra notes 226–228 and accompanying text. An argument
could be made that a defendant cannot “knowingly” waive their right to Sixth Amendment
depositions until they ascertain (from the prosecutor’s list) who they would have the right
to depose. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“A waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”). Given the
strong preference for waivability, see supra note 324, such an argument seems unlikely to
succeed. A nonwaivable right to the prosecutor’s disclosure of charging witnesses would,
moreover, complicate the practice of precharge plea bargaining. For a discussion of that
practice, see Michael M. O’Hear, The End of Bordenkircher: Extending the Logic of Apprendi
to Plea Bargaining, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 835, 895–97 (2006).
326. Anne R. Traum, Using Outcomes to Reframe Guilty Plea Adjudication, 66 Fla. L.
Rev. 823, 827 (2014); see also Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Laﬂer and Frye,
51 Duq. L. Rev. 595, 619 (2013) [hereinafter Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law] (“In essence,
virtually anything and everything can be a bargaining chip.”).
327. Or these might be the same situations and vary only depending on the viewer’s
normative priors. In that, they mirror the debate between “trial penalties” and “plea
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depositions means that not every case would actually see Sixth
Amendment depositions. It does not, however, mean that incorporating
depositions into our criminal procedure would be a futile exercise.
The approach to the Sixth Amendment this Essay proposes would
“unbundle” the confrontation right from a defendant’s package of trial
rights.328 Defendants could invoke their right to confrontation without
simultaneously invoking all the other rights that accompany a trial.
Unbundled rights are easier (i.e., less costly) for defendants to exercise.329
That’s signiﬁcant. For one thing, if defendants can credibly threaten to
exercise their Sixth Amendment confrontation right, that supplements
their leverage in plea negotiations. In a world where prosecutors hold
almost all the negotiating power,330 changing the bargaining dynamic is
not a bad thing.
But more importantly, making the right to confrontation less costly to
exercise means that in many cases, it could be exercised. In today’s criminal
legal system, prosecutors have enough leverage to dissuade defendants
from invoking their trial rights in all but the most unusual cases.331 But
they don’t have enough leverage to systematically dissuade defendants
from invoking their pretrial constitutional criminal procedure rights. Some
try. Some prosecutors, that is, condition plea offers on the defendant not
ﬁling, for instance, a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress.332 That
practice surely deters some defendants, but motions to suppress under the
Fourth Amendment remain fairly common in criminal litigation, as do
motions to suppress under the Fifth Amendment.333 The same would likely
discounts.” See generally Allison D. Redlich, Miko M. Wilford & Shawn Bushway,
Understanding Guilty Pleas Through the Lens of Social Science, 23 Psych. Pub. Pol’y & L.
458, 460 (2017) (“Whether [the] difference between the sentences received upon trial
conviction versus plea is called the ‘trial penalty’ or the ‘plea discount’ is often a matter of
perspective . . . .”).
328. On unbundling trial rights generally, see supra note 76.
329. Rappaport argues that some trial rights already are traded in piecemeal fashion.
See Rappaport, supra note 76, at 181.
330. See Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 Ind. L.J. 855, 895 (2019) (“But if everything
is a bargaining chip, the party that beneﬁts is the one with the most power to negotiate. In
the criminal system, that is the prosecutor.”); Ortman, Second-Best, supra note 77, at 1063
(“Plea bargaining today transpires in the shadow of overlapping offenses, draconian
sentencing laws, and punitive pre-trial detention, facets of our criminal law that add up to
enormous prosecutorial leverage.”).
331. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
332. On the existence of such plea offers, see Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty
Years of Deﬁance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 Yale L.J. 2150, 2157 (2013);
Gabriel J. Chin, Do Procedural Claims Drive Out Merits Claims in Plea Bargaining?: A
Comment on the Work of the Late Professor William Stuntz, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 767, 771
(2013).
333. See Stephen G. Valdes, Comment, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of
Criminal Law Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea Negotiations,
153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1709, 1728 (2005) (“[Survey respondents] reported that a suppression
motion was made in 7.34% of all cases, led to acquittal or dismissal in 11.62% of the cases
where the motion was made, and resulted in nonprosecution in an additional 0.69% of
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be true of Sixth Amendment depositions. Prosecutors would have the
incentive and the leverage to induce defendants to waive Sixth Amendment depositions in some cases, but not in all. In cases where defendants
perceived their confrontation right to have signiﬁcant value, they would
have a meaningful opportunity to exercise it.334
CONCLUSION
In his Laﬂer dissent, Justice Scalia lamented that the Court had
“open[ed] a whole new ﬁeld of constitutionalized criminal procedure:
plea-bargaining law.”335 He predicted that the “‘constitutional’ rules
governing [defense] counsel’s behavior” announced in Laﬂer and Frye
would inevitably “be followed by rules governing the prosecution’s
behavior in the plea-bargaining process.”336 Indeed, he regarded it as
“foolish to think” otherwise.337
Scalia’s nightmare should be our ambition. Yet no robust body of
constitutional plea bargaining law has materialized. The few times the
Court has waded into plea bargaining since Laﬂer and Frye, its
interventions have been aggressively modest.338 Nine years on, we are still
cases.”); id. at 1729 (“While the empirical costs of the Miranda rule are hotly debated, this
survey found that the motions were made in 3.97% of cases and succeeded 9.86% of the
time.” (footnote omitted)).
334. Florida’s experience with criminal depositions may be instructive here. As
explained above, Florida is among the states that permit defendants to conduct depositions.
See supra section III.C.1. Leaders of the Florida defense bar report that depositions are, in
actual practice, routine. Matthew Meyers, President of the Miami Chapter of the Florida
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (FACDL), observes: “[D]epositions are a very
regular part of my practice and that of a vast majority of my colleagues in Miami, and
throughout the State.” E-mail from Matthew Meyers, President, Miami FACDL, to author
(Nov. 2, 2020) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). “We may not take the deposition of
every witness listed [by the prosecution],” Meyers explains, “but the lead LEO [law
enforcement officer], complaining witnesses, eyewitness, etc. are usually taken.” Id.
Michelle Lambo, President of the Hillsborough County FACDL chapter, notes that she
“usually conduct[s] . . . a minimum of [two] depositions per case” and that “[m]ore
complicated matters[] will usually require more than [two] witnesses being deposed.” Email from Michelle D. Lambo, President, Hillsborough Cnty. FACDL, to author (Nov. 2,
2020) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). Benjamin Wurtzel, President of the Central
Florida FACDL chapter, agrees that depositions are an important and routinely-used
defense tool in Florida criminal cases. Telephone Interview with Benjamin Wurtzel,
President, Cent. Fla. FACDL (Nov. 6, 2020). Though it is beyond this Essay’s scope to
empirically assess the incidence of criminal depositions in Florida, these attorneys’
observations corroborate that Florida defendants’ opportunity to conduct depositions is
indeed meaningful.
335. Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 175 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 176 (emphasis omitted).
337. Id.
338. In Lee v. United States, the Court held that a defendant established prejudice to
support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim when his lawyer told him repeatedly (and
wrongly) that a guilty plea wouldn’t subject him to deportation. 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1963, 1967
(2017). Though the defendant had “no real defense” to the charge, and the Court
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waiting on the Court to take the next step in updating the constitutional
law of criminal procedure to account for the fact that ours is a post-trial
world.
The principal aim of this Essay is to nominate the Confrontation
Clause as the site of that next step. It’s a credible candidate, considering
its similarity (and proximity) to the Sixth Amendment’s Counsel Clause.
And there is a viable path forward. That path begins with recognizing that
the Confrontation Clause announces a substantive right, not an evidentiary rule, and with discarding the principle that limits the “witnesses
against” an accused to trial witnesses. Those doctrinal adjustments would
open the door to Sixth Amendment depositions and, thus, to restoring the
Confrontation Clause to its purpose of promoting fair and reliable
adjudication via adversarial testing.
To be sure, engrafting depositions into our criminal process will not
solve the deepest ills of American criminal justice. No one thing can. But
it would make the criminal legal system a notch “less awful.”339 More than
that, it would be an installment payment on the broader project the Court
began in Laﬂer and Frye.340 Many other aspects of our criminal procedure
might fruitfully be reconsidered and updated in light of plea bargaining,

recognized that this would ordinarily mean that a plea caused no prejudice, the Court
stressed the “unusual circumstances” of the case in its ruling. Id. at 1962–67. The next Term,
in Class v. United States, the Court held that a guilty plea does not, absent an explicit waiver,
preclude a defendant from ﬁling an appeal to challenge the constitutionality of the offense
to which he pleaded guilty. 138 S. Ct. 798, 801–02 (2018). The likely consequence of Class
is that standard plea agreements will include express waivers of this right. For a post-Class
example, see Plea Agreement at 9, United States v. DeVoe, No. 3:19CR86 (KAD) (D. Conn.
Apr. 8, 2019) (“[T]he defendant waives his right to challenge his conviction based on . . . a
claim that the statute(s) to which the defendant is pleading guilty is unconstitutional . . . .”).
For an interesting argument that Class and Lee are more signiﬁcant than they ﬁrst appear,
see Lucian E. Dervan, Class v. United States: Bargained Justice and a System of Efficiencies,
2017–2018 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 113, 119–25; see also Julian A. Cook, III, Federal Guilty Pleas:
Inequities, Indigence, and the Rule 11 Process, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1091–99 (2019).
339. See Alschuler, Two Small Band-Aids, supra note 103, at 707 (“[T]he time may have
come for criminal justice scholars to abandon the search for ways to make the criminal justice
system fair and principled. Their principal mission today should be to make it less awful.”).
340. See Simonson, supra note 15, at 2218 (“The Supreme Court’s . . . rulings in Laﬂer
v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye provide further support for the extension of the Sixth
Amendment into routine nontrial proceedings, as the Court indicated its willingness to
regulate the constitutionality of everyday plea bargaining procedures in light of the rarity of
trials today.” (footnotes omitted)).
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from pretrial discovery,341 to the right to compulsory process,342 to the
standard for initiating charges,343 to bail,344 to the prohibition against
double jeopardy,345 to name just a few. Updating the Confrontation Clause
could be a good step on the long road to criminal procedure
modernization.

341. Should defendants be constitutionally entitled to discovery before a guilty plea?
See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years After
Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 407, 409 (2014) (“[I]t is time for the
Court to recognize that effective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining requires that
defense lawyers have basic information about the case, both to fully advise their clients and
to effectively negotiate on behalf of their clients.”); Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law, supra note
326, at 610–18 (“Given the Court’s repeated emphasis on the importance of adequate
investigation . . . counsel’s duty to make some minimally sufficient investigation prior to
advising a client to plead guilty is both consistent with the Court’s Sixth Amendment case
law and logically apparent.”). But see United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–33 (2002)
(holding that the government need not disclose impeachment Brady material prior to a
plea, but leaving open the question as to exculpatory Brady material); Susan R. Klein,
Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 Duq. L. Rev. 559, 580 n.72 (2013) (“There is currently a
circuit split on the issue of whether a defendant can waive her right to exculpatory evidence
of actual innocence.” (citation omitted)).
342. Should defendants be constitutionally entitled to subpoena witnesses for
exculpatory evidence useful to them in plea bargaining? For scholarly efforts to ground a
right to criminal discovery in the Compulsory Process Clause (albeit not focused on plea
bargaining), see Montoya, supra note 229, at 873–78; Peter Westen, The Compulsory
Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 121–31 (1974).
343. Does the dominant probable cause standard for criminal charges continue to make
sense in a system dominated by pleas? I have argued that it does not. See Ortman, Probable
Cause, supra note 241, at 558–68 (contending that the probable cause charging standard
“exacerbates plea bargaining’s vices” and should “probably [be] on the chopping block”).
344. Does due process preclude the setting of unaffordable bail as leverage to coerce
guilty pleas? See Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711, 784–87 (2017)
(exploring this question). Further, in the age of plea bargaining, should the right to counsel
extend to bail hearings? See Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the Right to
Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1513, 1516–17 (2013) (arguing that it should).
345. In the age of plea bargaining, should jeopardy attach when plea negotiations
commence? For the current law on when jeopardy attaches in the context of guilty pleas,
see 6 LaFave et al., supra note 195, § 25.1(d) & nn.63–88.

508

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:451

